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Summary
In  December  2012  the  Council  of  the  European  Union  preliminarily 
approved  a  Commission's  Proposal  aimed  at  introducing  a  so-called 
“banking union” , namely the conferral to ECB of powers to supervise all 
the credit  institutions – a role which has been carried out by national 
authorities  until  today.  The change was deemed necessary in  order  to 
tackle the numerous problematic issues which have recently arisen and 
have  seriously  threatened  the  existence  of  the  Monetary  Union,  even 
suggesting a possible break-up.
What really happened? Why has a monetary union, and the creation of a 
single currency been pursued? How are all these issues connected to the 
liberalization of capital movements? How do they influence each other?
Although at the first glance it is not intuitive to grasp the numerous links 
between these issues, they exist and are extremely relevant. This work 
will try to shed light and to answer the aforementioned questions.
4
Abbreviations
AG Advocate General
CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union
ECB European Central Bank
EEC European Economic Community
EESC European Economic and Social Committee 
EFTA European Free Trade Association
EMS European Monetary System
EMU Economic and Monetary Union
ESCB European System of Central Banks
EU European Union
TEC Treaty establishing the European Community
TEU Treaty on European Union 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
5
Introduction
The evolution of the internal market in the European Union is nowadays 
one of the most  fundamental  topics in  light  of the long financial  and 
economic  crisis  that  has  hit  the  world  in  recent  years,  although  with 
different degrees depending on individual countries.
The decision to focus on the free movement of capital and its importance 
for the development of financial services market is supported by several 
reasons:  firstly  it  represents  the  least  developed of  the  four  freedoms 
included in the Treaties. Capital has been set aside for a long time unlike 
the free movement of goods, services and lately persons, which has seen 
a  constant  and  unstoppable  transformation  capable  of  influencing  the 
behavior of both Member State and European Institutions (mainly thanks 
to  the  contribution  offered  by  the  CJEU).  Despite  the  liberalization, 
which occurred more than twenty years ago, free movement of capital is 
still  perceived  almost  like  a  stranger,  if  not  openly  opposed:  the 
accusation  against  the  “speculation”  often  heard  these  years  appears 
furthermore to call into question the free market itself,  at  least in this 
field.
The amount of literature, as well as case-law, is moreover considerably 
lower  than  the  material  available  for  the  other  three  freedoms. 
Comprehensive works on the topic are just  a few, notwithstanding the 
growing importance of financial markets in the current situation.
Besides that, another reason to choose such an argument can be found in 
its interdisciplinary character: in order to understand the rationale behind 
capital liberalization, why it has been opposed for so long, and why its 
evolution differs to a large extent from other elements at the basis of the 
common market, due regard must be paid to factors outside the strict field 
of law.
This work wants to be a contribution to the discussion of the importance 
of reinforcing the experiment of internal market, seemingly under siege 
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during the last years, and to believe that what has been achieved so far 
has not been in vain.
To find a common thread between areas apparently distinct, such as the 
liberalization  of  capital,  the  monetary  union  and  banking  has  been  a 
difficult but at the same time extremely challenging experience. 
Methods and material
Due to the interdisciplinary character mentioned above, the material used 
for this research has been of different natures: beside monographic works 
and  articles  focusing  on  the  free  movement  of  capital  and  its  legal 
aspects,  the  study  incorporates  contributions  from  authors  active  in 
different fields, mainly economists. 
Some of the topics here analyzed, in fact, has often been studied in depth 
rather from the economic than the legal angle in the case of EMU or the 
possible implementation of a banking union.
The  attempt  of  this  work  is  to  propose  a  far-reaching  approach,  by 
connecting  the  legal  and  economic  issues  together.  An  operation  not 
without risks. This author, notwithstanding his interest in economics, has 
a legal background and the aim of the study remains focused on legal 
problems. At the same time some suggestions will be put forward, with 
all the caution necessary when it comes to questions not entirely familiar. 
Delimitations
The  topics  examined  here  are  generally  quite  broad  and  would  each 
deserve separate studies.
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Some  issues  have  been  deliberately  excluded  for  space  reasons  or 
because collateral in relation to the main questions which are the object 
of this work. This does not mean they are secondary or less relevant.
Many authors, on the basis primarily of the case-law of the CJEU, have 
addressed  the  problems  between  the  free  movement  of  capital  and 
taxation,  a  field characterized by complex and numerous legal  issues. 
This  topic  will  not  be  part  of  the  study:  its  peculiarity  places  it  in  a 
different position and requires an autonomous analysis.
The other issue excluded is the relationship between European Union and 
third countries as regards direct investments, due to the notable feature of 
free  movement  of  capital  in  comparison  with  other  Treaty  freedoms, 
being the only case in which persons established outside the Union are 
granted to rely on that (as confirmed by the CJEU with some limitations). 
This  topic  will  be  only  partially  addressed  and  only  to  the  extent 
necessary for the purposes of this work, since it may lead the discussion 
far from the core issues analyzed here.
For similar reasons, the discussion on banking and monetary issues will 
be focused only on limited points,  disregarding technical  and political 
aspects.
Main ideas and their order
The scope of this research is to present how the free movement of capital 
is  framed  nowadays,  starting  from  its  legal  basis  and  its  evolution 
through the rulings of the CJEU, without forgetting the historical context 
in  which  the  changes  have  occurred.  Moreover,  to  imagine  future 
developments  in  light  of  the  EMU and  the  possible  move  towards  a 
tighter financial integration represented by the proposal of banking union.
This paper will outline the transformations in the legal framework, since 
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the inception in  the late  1950s to the most  recent  modifications,  with 
particular  attention  to  the  process  which  has  led  to  the  adoption of  a 
common currency and the relationship between monetary integration and 
the liberalization of capital.
Finally, the work will try to analyze whether the steps forwards in the 
ambit of financial services and the strengthening of ties by means of an 
unitary  banking  supervision  may  have  a  possible  effect  on  the  free 
movement of capital.
Chapter 1 will address the historical premises and the general aspects in 
favor  of  liberalization  of  capital  from  both  a  legal  and  economic 
perspective.
Chapter 2 will thoroughly analyze the issues in detail regarding the free 
movement of capital: the definition of capital, restrictions – with  a focus 
on  the  case-law above  all  –  as  well  as  the  relationship  between  free 
movement of capital and the other freedoms with particular attention to 
the freedom to provide services.
Chapter 3 will explain the legal basis of EMU, the rationale behind it and 
why the free movement of capital is inextricably linked to the monetary 
dimension.
Chapter  4  will  go  through  the  main  features  of  the  legal  framework 
concerning banking within the European Union and the problems that 
have recently arisen.
Chapter 5 will finally examine the proposal of a banking union, its main 
features, along with the legal issues which may result, and the possible 
impact on capital and financial services markets.
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1 The free movement of capital
1.1 Capital and the other freedoms: a general overview
The  idea  of  European  integration  has  been  based,  since  the  very 
beginning,  on  the  establishment  of  a  common  market  where  goods, 
persons, services and capital could move free from impediments.1 Such a 
process  would  have  fostered  economic  growth  and  furthered  the  ties 
between the single member states by obliging them to cooperate fairly 
towards the common objective of durable development.
All of the four freedoms, which lie at the foundations of the European 
Union (and previously the European Community in the pre-Maastricht 
era)  have been explicitly enshrined in the Treaties since the inception 
with Treaty of Rome (EEC), signed in 1957 and entered into force the 
following year.
However,  despite everyone  appearing  of  equal  importance,2 the  free 
movement of capital has been for many years the “last” freedom not just 
in  the  order  mentioned  above,  but  also  in  practice.3 Unlike  free  of 
movement of goods, person and services, which has been objective of 
extensive case-law of  the  CJEU and constantly developed in order  to 
remove progressively all the hindrances to the harmonious evolution of 
the  common  market,  the  treatment  reserved  to  capital  differed 
considerably at least until the end of the 1980s. 
For several decades the free movement of capital was seen as the “poor 
relative”  of  the  freedoms,4 whose  implementation  was  regarded  as 
1 Art. 26(2) TFEU ('an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is 
ensured')
2 Ryan  Murphy,  'Changing  Treaty and  Changing  Economic  Context:  the  Dynamic  Relationship  of  the  Legislature  and  the 
Judiciary in  the  Pursuit  of  Capital  Liberalisation'  in  Paul  Syrpis  (ed),  The  Judiciary,  the  Legislature  and  the  EU Internal  Market 
(Cambridge University Press, 2012) 275 referring to art. 3(1)(a) EEC
3 Ibid 275-276; Catherine Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU (3rd edition, Oxford University Press, 2010) 559
4 Steffen Hindelang, The Free Movement of Capital and Foreign Direct Investment: The Scope of Protection in EU Law (Oxford 
Scholarship Online, 2009) 31-32
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desirable but in practice not really necessary. Such an attitude, which can 
be identified by reading the original provisions of the Treaties, was not 
without grounds as it will be explained in this work, but at the same time 
it constituted a serious obstacle to the completion of internal market.
The decision to completely liberalize the movements of capital started the 
final stage of European integration which is  still  ongoing, namely the 
strategy  meant  to  achieve  a  real  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  by 
setting the premises necessary to adopt a single currency and to promote 
a further interdependence of the member states: a project still valid for 
the  reasons  that  will  be  illustrated  here,  notwithstanding  the  difficult 
challenges posed by the financial crisis burst in 2008. 
1.2 The origins and the evolution: from the Treaty of Rome to 
the Treaty of Lisbon.
The free movement of capital, as mentioned in the previous section, was 
already included in the first Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community in 1957, the founding Treaty of Rome, under the original 
articles  67  –  73:  the  liberalization  was  deemed  a  part  of  the  process 
which would lead to a true economic unification in Europe.
An  evident  difference  in  comparison  with  the  other  provisions 
concerning the movement of goods (now art. 28 TFEU), persons (art. 45) 
and services  (art.  56)  might  be noted at  the first  glance:  the Member 
States, to which the obligations set in the treaties are primarily addressed, 
undertook  in  the  original  version  of  the  Treaty  (art.  67  EEC)  to 
'progressively abolish' all restrictions to the free flow of capital and only 
'to  the  extent  necessary  to  ensure  the  functioning  of  internal  market', 
accepting at the same time not to introduce new obstacles, as set out in 
the so-called “standstill” clause (art. 71 EEC). The feature of the latter 
provision was, however, to allow the states which had adopted a more 
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restrictive approach to retain all the capital controls existing at that time, 
while more liberal countries were in theory prevented from introducing 
similar measures. In practice, instead, the wording of the rule was not 
deemed imperative, since it requested only that the States “endeavor” not 
to introduce new restrictions, without providing for any sanction for its 
eventual breach.5 Clearly the situation could not be uniform at all.
The wording of the Treaty differed in a substantial way with regards to 
capital:  while  the  provisions  relative  to  the  other  freedoms  had  been 
drawn up in an imperative manner (the restrictions 'shall'  be abolished 
once  expired  the  transitional  period),  these  rules  could  not  entail  an 
obligation but seemed to suggest how the free movement of capital was 
to be postponed6 until an undefined moment, most likely once achieved a 
common market in goods and services.7 
Moreover, such a freedom appeared to be subordinate, as if there were a 
hierarchy. The escape clause gave leeway to the States, by stating that 
free movement of capital was necessary only when it did not interfere 
with  the  freedom  of  trade.8 In  other  words,  Member  States  were 
authorized to restrict free movement of capital when such a solution was 
considered suitable for their needs on the basis of internal policy choices.
Another remarkable characteristic is the connection, provided for by art. 
61(2) EEC (now art. 58(2) TFEU) of capital with the liberalization of the 
banking  and financial  services:  the  drafters  made  it  explicit  that  they 
were to be pursued in parallel. The close connections between capital and 
banking services were well known by the drafters, and the choice was to 
limit the freedom to provide services in this specific area: if a capital 
movement  not  yet  liberalized  was  related  to  a  service,  the  rules 
concerning the former prevailed on the latter, barring an individual from 
5 John A. Usher, The Law of Money and Financial Services in European Community (2nd edition, Oxford University Press, 2000) 
16
6 Sideek Mohamed, European Community Law on the Free Movement of Capital and the EMU (Nordsteds Juridik, 1999) 46
7 As the Spaak Report, drafted in 1956 and which posed the basis for the negotiation of the treaty of Rome the following year, 
openly suggested; see also Jukka Snell, 'Free Movement of Capital: Evolution as a Non-linear Process' in Paul Craig and Gràinne de 
Bùrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (2nd edition, Oxford University Press, 2011) 574
8 Age F.P. Bakker,  The Liberalization of Capital Movements in Europe: the Monetary committee and Financial Integration,  
1958-1994 (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996) 42-43
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relying on the Treaties provisions, regardless of their direct effect.9 
The  Treaty  provisions  remained  substantially  identical  until  the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992, in which the liberalization of the movements 
of  capital  was for  the  first  time enshrined under  art.  73(b)  (and then 
renumbered as  art.  56),  thereby finally conferring  to  this  freedom the 
same value granted to the others. The change did not come overnight, but 
it was the product of long years of discussion between the Member States 
and  between  the  States  and  the  European Institutions.  It  substantially 
mirrored  the  content  of  the  Directive  88/361/EEC10 (hereinafter  “the 
Directive  88/361”),  the  most  relevant  act  enacted  to  implement  the 
hitherto  treaty  provisions.  This  freedom  is  the  only  one  to  have 
undergone such a transformation.
The content of these provisions has not been changed in a significant way 
with the adoption of the following Treaties: free movement of capital is 
now provided for by articles 63 – 66 of TFEU.
It is obvious how the decision to modify the Treaty rules (primary source 
of law) had a precise purpose: to make it clear that the move towards a 
more  integrated  market,  including  that  in  the  financial  services,  was 
deemed to be irreversible, whereas the secondary legislation may always 
be subject to changes depending on the political or economic situation.11 
The rules on capital are closely linked to those concerning EMU, which 
is seen as a one-way process12 (see infra chapter 3).
9 Usher, The Law of Money and Financial Services in European Community (n 5) 17, with reference to the case C-267/86 Van 
Eycke v. ASPA [1988] ECR 4769: the plaintiff was denied the protection by the current art. 56 TFEU due to the fact that opening a saving  
account by a bank situated in another Member State had not been liberalized by that time.
10 Council Directive 88/361 of 24 June 1988 for the implementation of the art. 67 of the Treaty [1988] OJ L178/5
11 Usher, The Law of Money and Financial Services in European Community (n 5) 24
12 Mohamed, European Community Law on the Free Movement of Capital and the EMU (n 6) 99
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1.3 Historical background: from the least developed freedom to 
a driving force towards further integration
1.3.1 The reasons behind the cautious approach: general aspects
One  might  wonder  why  the  original  drafters  of  the  Treaties,  while 
accepting provisions framed in an imperative way as regards the other 
elements constituting the internal market, adopted an extremely cautious 
approach when it came to capital movements.
The same reasons behind such a choice are at the ground of the wary 
answer given by the CJEU in its  early case-law on the topic and are 
connected to the main object of this study, namely the analysis of the 
close connections between free movement of capital, monetary union and 
financial services market.
In order to explain these links adequately, some economic concepts are 
also to be borne in mind, as explained in the section 1.3.2.
The free movement of capital, in fact, has a significant bearing on the 
monetary and financial sovereignty of the states: it is no wonder then that 
the complete liberalization was the fundamental condition for a Member 
State in order to join the EMU.
The free flow of capital,  once allowed to circulate without limitations 
(and  although  some  possible  restrictions  remain,  indicating  that  the 
freedom is not absolute,  as well  as the other three),  may have indeed 
alleged negative effects, such as speculative movements; in any case, it 
seriously  affects  the  sphere  of  economic  choices  pursued  by  each 
government.
The original member states were not ready to accept these challenges in 
the beginning. They were not willing to surrender financial and monetary 
competences.13
13 Bakker (n 8) 43
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First of all it is fundamental to remember the historical context in which 
the Treaty of Rome was drawn up: Europe was still recovering from the 
Second World War and it was almost taken for granted that the regime of 
Bretton  Woods,  with  the  Dollar  as  the  main  reserve  currency  and  a 
system of fixed rates as the general rule, would have prevailed forever.
The European integration had just made its first steps and the idea of 
appointing an upper, supranational, body to take fundamental choices in 
such  sensitive  fields  was  not  even  conceivable.  In  this  context  it  is 
understandable how the liberalization of capital movement was regarded 
as something to achieve at a future stage, leaving the states the room of 
maneuver for different policies as regards finances, namely how to set the 
interest rate.14 In absence of coordination, capital controls were viewed as 
an instrument of policy or anyhow the lesser evil.
Hence the original wording of the Treaty of Rome was formulated in a 
conditional way, leaving the implementation of such a freedom to the 
secondary legislation to  be  enacted by the Council  (and therefore  the 
Member States), as provided for by art. 69 EEC. Directives have been 
enacted since the 1960s, with a partial liberalization, until 1988, when a 
final decisive step towards full liberalization was taken and eventually 
incorporated in the Maastricht Treaty. 
As some authors argue, this freedom is the only one where the rules laid 
down in the treaties were followed strictly, thus the liberalization was to 
occur by means of the secondary legislation without (at least in its first 
stages) the strong intervention of the CJEU against the lack of initiative 
either  of  European  Institutions  or  the  Member  States,  as  it  can  be 
observed instead for the others.15
The process has proven to be particularly slow and often hampered by 
contingent  urgencies  which  posed  serious  threats  to  its  development: 
during  this  lapse  of  time  several  states  have  resorted,  for  different 
reasons,  to  various  types  of  capital  controls  whereby  the  freedom of 
14 Bakker (n 8) 19-21
15 Usher, The Law of Money and Financial Services in European Community (n 5) 19, to which Murphy (n 2) 274 expressly refers.
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movement,  although apparently an important  element of the European 
legal framework, had been considerably curtailed.
The history of the free movement of capital has seen different stages. An 
early  period,  few years  after  the  enter  into  force  of  the  EEC Treaty, 
showed a partial liberalization, which was followed by a dramatic reverse 
during the 1970s, unanimously viewed as a “lost decade”. The collapse 
of the Bretton Woods system, the oil crises and a general political unrest 
put on hold the development of an integrated capital market in Europe, 
with  many  countries  reverting  to  different  type  of  restrictions,  often 
unsuitable to counter the negative effect of the economic conjuncture.16
Finally,  in the 1980s  the necessity to resume the path towards capital 
integration was acknowledged with the adoption of the aforementioned 
Directive 88/361, prelude to the final stage begun with the Maastricht 
Treaty and the creation of EMU.
 
1.3.2 Economic rationale and policy
It is impossible to completely understand the free movement of capital, 
and its importance, without taking into account the economic background 
at its basis. 
As previously mentioned, free capital may seriously impinge the notion 
of  monetary  sovereignty:  if  restrictions  are  to  be  abolished,  financial 
resources can move quickly from one state to another, thereby limiting 
the  power  of  governments  and  monetary  authorities  (usually  Central 
Banks). How? Some examples can be enlightening.
A capital inflow may force the authorities to lower the interest rate to a 
level which might be deemed inadequate for the internal equilibrium of 
the  state;  vice-versa,  an  abundant  outflow  towards  countries  deemed 
more reliable or where more opportunities exist can suggest a higher rate 
16 Hindelang (n 4) 35
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in order to avoid losing investors.17 In both cases the state sees its power 
to adopt a monetary policy seriously impaired. The latter hypothesis is 
moreover the typical scenario where the states have advocated the use of 
capital restraints: a massive outbound flow often feeds the fear of a drain 
of resources,  which can impact  tax revenues18 and therefore leave the 
state with fewer possibilities to apply its own economic policy.
Some reasons against free movement of capital are, for instance: possible 
speculation, undesirable outflows to third countries through states with a 
liberal regime, the alleged risk of tax evasion and finally the fear that the 
lack of restraints would entail the flow of capital towards developed and 
rich areas to the detriment of others in need of investments.19
At the same time a moveable capital plays a decisive role in setting the 
exchange rates of the single currencies, whose floating might turn out to 
be harmful for the national economy and not sustainable in the long term. 
Especially states whose public finances were not sound were afraid that 
possible devaluations (which eventually would be occurring despite the 
array of measures adopted20) could have serious repercussions, such as 
inflationary pressure and the consequent need to adjust the interest rate in 
a manner contrary to that regarded as preferable at that time.
The capital liberalization is thus a powerful tool. It is one of the element 
of the so-called “impossible trinity”, along with fixed exchange rates and 
an independent monetary policy, as depicted by economists (see chapter 
3).  Furthermore,  serious disturbances in the balance of payments may 
occur.
The choice to limit such a freedom, by leaving open the possibility to 
restore capital controls and conceding a certain margin of maneuver to 
the states, was therefore comprehensible in the initial stage of the process 
leading  to  European  unification.  It  was  seen  as  necessary  that  the 
17 Willem Molle, The Economics of European Integration: Theory, Practice, Policy (5th edition, Ashgate, 2006) 120
18 Ibid 121
19 Bakker (n 8) 32
20 Ibid 102-103: the author illustrates that several downward reallignments occurred throughout history, despite the attempts of the  
states to avoid them. French Franc was a clear example. 
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Member States would drive the process and not be led by market forces, 
mainly  by  enacting  the  secondary  legislation  to  be  fashioned  on  the 
degree of evolution reached by the internal market. The topic was too 
sensitive  to  be  left  without  caution  and  in  the  beginning  the  CJEU 
followed suit in this approach.
1.4 The free  movement  of  capital  and the  Court  of  Justice: 
case-law evolution
On the basis  of the premises outlined here,  it  is  worth looking at the 
stance  taken by the  most  important  institution  as  regards  the  internal 
market, namely the Court of Justice.
Unlike  goods,  services  and also  persons  (cases  such as  Dassonville,21 
Reyners,22 Cassis de Dijon23 and  Van Binsbergen24 just  to mention the 
most important) where the CJEU ruled that restrictive measures were to 
be regarded as inconsistent with the Community law and at the same time 
indicated thoroughly the only ways by means of which they could be 
deemed acceptable, the attitude concerning capital took since the very 
beginning a different inclination.
A common opinion between scholars is that the attitude of the Court in 
this special area is an authentic “deference” towards other Institutions, 
mainly the Council.25 While in the aforementioned decisions the CJEU 
struck down national restrictions incompatible with the relevant Treaty 
provisions, even when a margin of discretion was conferred to Council 
itself,  namely  by  ruling  out  that  the  lack  of  adoption  of  secondary 
legislation (the fact that the Council had remained idle where the Treaty 
required  the  enactment  of  directives  or  regulations)  could  prevent  an 
21 Case C-8/74 [1974] ECR 837
22 Case C-2/74 [1974] ECR 631
23 Case C-120/78 [1978] ECR 649
24 Case C-33/74 [1974] ECR 1299
25 Murphy (n 2) 550
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individual  from relying  on  the  Treaties  provisions,  the  approach  was 
exactly the opposite as regards capital movements.
The  case-law  with  regards  to  this  freedom  is  way  less  extensive, 
especially during the first decades.26 The landmark decision is the Casati 
judgement,27 in which the Court declared (although not explicitly, but it 
can  be  easily  inferred  from  the  text  and  no-one  has  ever  claimed  a 
different reading) that the art. 67 EEC had no direct effect, thence it could 
not be relied on by an individual in order to set aside a national rule 
allegedly inconsistent with it.
Why deference? The comparison with other important rulings is helpful 
to  this  end:  neither  the  wording  of  the  provision,  with  its  particular 
features  as  highlighted  in  the  section  1.1,  nor  the  fact  that  secondary 
legislation  had  to  be  enacted  could  amount  to  an  insurmountable 
preclusion to direct effect.28 
It is true that the article is not framed in a imperative way and then it may 
be doubtful if  such a doctrine (created by CJEU itself  since the well-
known  decision  Van  Gend  and  Loos29)  could  apply;  but  similar 
considerations did not prevent the Court from ruling in favor of a far-
reaching approach, according to which the movement of goods, service 
and person were liberalized despite the ambiguity of the Treaty.30
In this case the Court appeared to be very cautious, recognizing to some 
extent  the  importance  of  the  economic  issues  behind  the  legislative 
choice  and  applying  a  sort  of  self-restraint:31 this  aspect  cannot  be 
disregarded and marked a clear distinction between capital and the rest of 
the  freedoms  constituting  the  internal  market.  The  CJEU refused  the 
innovative  role  that  it  had  played  previously,32 thereby  leaving  the 
26 Leo Flynn, 'Coming of Age: the Free Movement of Capital Case Law 1993-2002' (2002), Kluwer Law International, no. 39, p. 
773: the authors underscores that only ten judgements were delivered during the first 35 years of the Community
27 Case C-203/80 [1981] ECR 2595
28 Snell (n 7) 549: the author analyzes thoroughly all the arguments in favor and against the Court reasoning, coming to the  
conclusion that none of them alone was decisive but rather the economic-political considerations; Mohamed, European Community Law 
on the Free Movement of Capital and the EMU (n 6) 60-61, with reference to case-law such as case C-33/70 SACE [1970] ECR 1213
29 Case C-26/62 [1963] ECR 1
30 Murphy (n 2) 60
31 Murphy (n 2) 278-279
32 Bakker (n 8) 47; Hindelang (n 4) 34
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responsibility to the Council and the Member States, without taking the 
“driving seat”. The evolution of the free movement of capital, at least in 
this  phase,  is  characterized  by intergovernmentalism,  an  image  rather 
unusual if compared with the other freedoms.33 The only way to achieve a 
free  internal  market  for  capital  was  through  positive  integration:  the 
Member States could either decide that directives were to be adopted or 
liberalize on their own.34
The CJEU acknowledged how capital liberalization could undermine the 
economic policy of the Member States or have a negative effect on the 
balance of payments, thereby impairing the functioning of the internal 
market:35 similar  observations are totally absent  in the aforementioned 
case-law  concerning  goods  or  services,  where  the  Court  rejected 
justifications based on economic grounds. In this case, instead, the CJEU 
explicitly recognized the Council as the only legitimate body to which 
the Treaty conferred the power to abolish capital restrictions. Capital was 
seen  as  a  sensitive  area,  bearing  policy  implications;  a  Court's 
intervention would have had a striking impact that was likely deemed 
beyond the role conferred by the Treaties to CJEU.36 Another argument is 
that  in  this  field  the  Council  had  deliberately  decided,  by  enacting 
directives, not to liberalize all capital movements. Unlike the case-law 
related to other freedoms, the Court preferred to respect such a choice 
without taking a strong stance in favor of the removal of barriers.37 The 
decision left room for a different interpretation though. 
The  absence  of  a  straightforward  rule  capable  of  conferring  right  to 
individuals led the CJEU to limit its role in assessing whether the Council 
by exercising the powers had overstepped its limits of discretion.  The 
Court concluded that it did not occur, nor the clause included in art. 71 
33 Snell (n 7) 554
34 Murphy (n 2) 278
35 Ibid 279; Bakker (n 8) 47; Mohamed, European Community Law on the Free Movement of Capital and the EMU (n 6) 61
36 Murphy (n 2) 274
37 Snell (n 7) 550;  Mohamed,  European Community Law on the Free Movement of Capital and the EMU (n 6) 62: the powers 
conferred to the Council by art. 69 EEC might be interpreted as a further obstacle to direct effect of art. 67.
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EEC could  have any bearing  being  also  not  framed in  an  imperative 
way38 (see back section 1.2).
Such an attitude would change after the adoption of the Directive 88/361, 
when the CJEU would apply the stricter standards which it is associated 
with  and  rule  on  the  direct  effect  of  the  directive  itself  first  (case 
Bordessa39) and subsequently once the Maastricht treaty had entered into 
force (case Sanz de Lera40) (see chapter 2, section 2.6.1). Since then, the 
CJEU has assumed the same position it has always had in relation to the 
other freedoms, pushing in favor of internal market.41
1.5 The importance of such a freedom from both a legal and 
economic perspective
The situation analyzed thus far explains why the capital movements have 
been liberalized slower than goods, services and persons and the reasons 
behind the approach followed by the Institutions and the Member States.
However, in order to understand why this freedom plays a fundamental 
role, it is necessary to outline its undoubted positive aspects.
An  internal  market  without  free  capital  risks  to  be  nothing  than  an 
illusion:  it  would  be  pointless  to  ensure  an  unfettered  access  to  an 
integrated area such as European Union if obtaining financial resources 
was made difficult  or  impossible  by the  single  States.  In  the field  of 
financial  services,  which  is  one  of  the  main  topics  of  this  study,  an 
individual would be deterred from looking for providers located outside 
its country of origin if there were restrictions on the possible operations 
(for  example,  getting a  loan assisted by mortgage),42 especially in  the 
38 John A. Usher, 'The Evolution of the Free Movement of Capital',  Fordham International Law Journal May, 2008 31 Fordham 
Int'l L.J. 1533 1536
39 Joined cases C-358/93 and C-416/93 [1995] ECR I-361
40 Joined cases C-163/94, C-165/94 and C-250/94 [1995] ECR I-4821
41 Snell (n 7) 552
42 Mohamed, European Community Law on the Free Movement of Capital and the EMU (n 6) 89; Usher, The Law of Money and 
Financial Services in European Community (n 5) 17
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banking sector.43 In order to ensure a real open market, the same degree 
of  liberalization  is  to  be applied  to  all  the  freedoms enshrined in  the 
Treaties.
Free movement of capital is ancillary and a natural complement of all the 
other  freedoms.  The  impossibility  to  raise  barriers  to  trade  would  be 
frustrated  (if  not  even  circumvented)  were  restrictions  to  capital 
movements to be admissible, since this freedom facilitates the exercise of 
the others.44 
Such an awareness returned to the surface during the 1980s, in particular 
with the White Book drafted in 1985,45 where the need to complete the 
internal market required to take a step further in direction of a tighter 
integration. The capital movements had the lion's share. 
It was clear that the process had been slowed down too much in the past, 
often by adopting solutions which had proven ineffective and unsuitable 
to  address  the  main  economic  issues.  Member  States  had extensively 
used capital  controls in order to protect their  own exchange rates and 
their monetary policies. The original drafters had adopted a minimalistic 
approach, which almost excluded any monetary consideration in light of 
the historical context.46 Being absent any means to deal with monetary 
issues,  the  free  movement  of  capital  had  to  be  set  aside  until  the 
completion  of  internal  market,  whose  development  might  have  been 
undermined  by  capital  flows  exerting  pressure  on  interest  rates  and 
currencies.
A decisive shift was required after the dramatic changes occurred in the 
1970s. The completion by means of liberalization of the capital markets 
could not be postponed any further: the decision to resume the process of 
integration  is  likely  to  have  been  suggested  by  the  choice  of  some 
member  states,  most  notably  Great  Britain,  which  had  opted  for  the 
43 Natalia Białek, Arkadius Bazylko , 'Free Movement of Money in European Union – The Role of the European Court of Justice  
in the Formation of Free Movement of Capital and Payments'  (2011),  Financial Internet Quarterly “e-Finanse”, vol. 7, no. 2,  www.e-
finanse.com 58
44 Mohamed, European Community Law on the Free Movement of Capital and the EMU (n 6) 63
45 Bakker (n 8) 161
46 Ibid 53
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removal of all restrictions paving the way for a similar development in 
other countries. A positive economic conjuncture made it possible to lean 
towards “deregulation”.
From  an  economic  point  of  view,  capital  integration  has  many 
advantages. It allows a better allocation of the resources47 and it reduces 
distortions. An area such as Europe is not affected by disturbances which 
instead may occur in a smaller market. The supply of capital increases, 
because investors may find the most favorable conditions and therefore 
savings are mobilized.48 More investments are the natural consequence.
It  may then encourage a free and open competition,49 thereby causing 
positive effects for consumers and fostering economic growth. It permits 
direct investments, opening the market to foreign investors and rendering 
the Common Market more attractive.
The free movement of capital  ensures that market actors can find the 
resources necessary for their investments at the best conditions possible50 
and tailored to their needs: in such a way savings from a country might 
be available for those seeking investors in other Member states, with the 
effect to reduce the cost for capital itself and therefore make an economic 
activity more profitable.
It is true (as it can be also noted nowadays) that free capital flows may 
cause speculation, but at the same time the cost for not liberalizing is 
higher  than  that  required  to  thwart  possible  negative  effects  (on  the 
inefficiency and lack of effectiveness of capital controls see section 3.4.4 
infra).
47 Białek, Bazylko (n 43) 57
48 Molle (n 17) 121
49 Ibid 121
50 Thomas Horsley, 'The Concept of an Obstacle to Intra-Eu Capital Movement in EU Law' in Niamh Nic Shuibhne and Laurence  
W. Gormley (eds), From Single Market to Economic Union: Essays in Memory of John A. Usher (Oxford Scholarship Online, 2012) 1
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2 What is capital?
2.1 In search of a definition
In the previous chapter the history of the free movement of capital has 
briefly been outlined, explaining why it differed deeply from the other 
three  freedoms  despite  being  it  a  fundamental  element  as  well  for  a 
working open market. However, the meaning of “capital” is often hard to 
describe with precision and it seems to be comprising different kind of 
situations.
While  goods  and  persons  (or  workers)  are  concepts  well  defined  or 
however tangible and services are instead identified in a residual way, 
namely as anything not belonging to the other categories (art. 57 TFEU), 
to identify what capital exactly means is less intuitive.
As if it was not difficult enough, the european legislator has introduced, 
alongside  capital,  the  figure  of  “payments”  without  providing express 
criteria  to  distinguish  between  them.  Although  such  a  distinction  has 
progressively lost the importance it used to have, from a theoretical point 
of view the two concepts are still different and therefore it is important to 
avoid ambiguity by describing their respective key features. See section 
2.6.2 infra.
Again,  it  must be borne in mind that several connections between the 
legal and the economic field exist,  but at the same time that does not 
entail a complete overlap or an interchangeability of the notions at stake. 
For the purpose of this study, the definition of capital drawn from the 
economic sphere will be shortly described, along with that used by the 
CJEU and the legal sources which are relevant on the point.
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2.2 Absence of express definitions in the Treaties
The first problem for each legal scholar is to identify the scope of the 
provisions regarding capital.
Since the enactment of the Directive 88/361 and the Maastricht Treaty in 
1992, the complete liberalization implies that all the restrictions to free 
movement  are  prohibited  (now art.  63  TFEU):  the  provision  is  clear, 
precise, unconditional and it does not require any implementing measure, 
thus  it  is  deemed to be directly effective.  All  capital  movements,  and 
payments, cannot be restricted save in case of possible exceptions (which 
can be express or based on the so-called rule of reason test,  see  infra 
2.5.4). Unlike the first decades of European integration, this freedom has 
now the same value of the other three.
Once said  that,  the  main  question  remains:  what  constitutes  a  capital 
movement? The answers is extremely important also in order to decide 
whether a situation is to be regulated under the rules analyzed here or by 
those  concerning  goods,  persons  and  services.  It  must  also  be 
remembered that the Treaty protects the “movement”, namely the transfer 
and not the capital as such.51
The Treaty provisions are not very helpful. Some figures such as “direct 
investment” or “financial Services” are mentioned (art. 64, with regards 
to possible restrictions) but without further explanations.
The Court itself has never relied on the Treaty rules in order to find a 
solution.  The  case-law  offers  nevertheless  a  guidance:  in  numerous 
occasions the CJEU has not fashioned an autonomous notion of capital 
movement  but  has  simply  referred  to  the  Directive  88/361,  more 
specifically to its Annex known as the “Nomenclature”.52 The long list 
provided indicated several possible operations, even though it cannot be 
considered exhaustive, as its preamble states; a further element in favor 
51 Hindelang, (n 4) 48-49
52 Horsley (n 50) 158
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of  this  interpretation,  widely  accepted,  is  the  existence  of  a  residual 
category named 'other',  indicating  that  even operations  not  mentioned 
could doubtless fall within the scope of the freedom.53
Some examples are securities such as transactions on the capital markets, 
financial loans and credits, import and export of financial assets.
With the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty and the modifications 
occurred  in  the  field  of  capital,  as  described  in  the  first  chapter,  the 
Directive 88/361 has been repealed but it  still  maintains its  indicative 
value.  The  CJEU,  in  fact,  constantly  refers  to  it  such  as  in  the  case 
Trummer & Mayer (whose main point revolved around a loan assisted by 
a mortgage taken abroad and its registration),54 notwithstanding the only 
legal provisions to be taken into account nowadays are those set out in 
the TFEU.
One remarkable aspect is that, despite the different typologies mentioned 
in the Directive 88/361, the CJEU has always refrained from formulating 
a univocal positive definition as to what constitutes a capital movement, 
preferring often to address the individual problems for each situation and 
thereby offering ad hoc solutions. The necessary features, which must be 
present in order to apply the relative rules,55 have never been outlined 
with  precision.  A  practice  that  has  often  led  to  doubts  as  to  the 
qualification to give in cases where the boundaries between capital and 
services, establishment or even goods (typical case coins and other means 
of  payment  which  are  not  legal  tender56)  are  blurred,  as  it  will  be 
explained in section 2.7.
2.3 Economic concept
The notion of capital is drawn from the economic field, as widely known.
53 Klaus J. Hopt, Eddy Wymeersch (eds), European Company and Financial Law (4th edition, Oxford University Press, 2007) 435
54 Case C-222/97 [1999] ECR I-1661
55 Horsley (n 50) 158
56 Case C-7/78 R. v. Thompson [1978] ECR 2247
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However, such a definition is necessarily broad and encompasses various 
figures. A distinction may be made between “financial” capital, defined 
as any potential input for a future production, and capital as all the factors 
of production.57 
The  drafters  of  the  Directive  88/361,  as  well  as  CJEU,  have  always 
seemed to be aware of the difficulty to give one definition capable of 
covering all the possible meanings of the term “capital”, therefore they 
opted  for  an open list  bearing in  mind that  the  evolution  in  financial 
markets could introduce figures unknown before.58
The numerous types of capital movement described in the Annex reveal 
the  breadth  of  the  category;  the  Treaty  itself,  even  after  Maastricht, 
continue  to  adopt  a  general  definition  in  order  to  maintain  a  certain 
flexibility in the rules at issue.
One  main  distinction  is  between  portfolio  investments,  aimed  at 
obtaining a revenue and those investments whose purpose is instead to 
take over or gain a decisive influence over an undertaking. If the former 
category falls obviously within the scope of the free movement of capital, 
the  latter  is  more  problematic  and  it  may entail  an  overlap  with  the 
freedom of establishment (art. 49 TFEU).59 See section 2.7 infra.
2.4 The secondary legislation implementing the original treaty 
provisions from the 60s to Maastricht Treaty
A little summary is useful at this point, before going into further details. 
As previously mentioned, the free movement of capital, mainly due to 
economic and political issues, did not follow the same path of the other 
freedoms, where the CJEU exercised a strong role in order to remove all 
57 Hindelang (n 4) 46
58 Ibid 43-44
59 Horsley (n  50)  158:  according to  the  author,  the  acquisition  of  shares  granting the  investor  a  “definite  influence”  in  the  
management of the undertaking concerned is not caught by the rules on capital, with reference to case C-436/00, X and Y v. Skatteverket, 
[2002] ECR I-10829
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the hindrances to the development of the internal market (even though it 
meant superseding the role conferred to the Council  and therefore the 
Member States); the liberalization thus was to occur by means of positive 
integration, namely through directives, and it was to be gradual in order 
not to impinge the competences in the monetary and financial field left to 
the Member States until the Maastricht Treaty.
There were constant ebb and flows, characterized by different degrees of 
freedom, owing to the influence of external circumstances which exerted 
a strong strain over the integration process.
In the 1960s two directives were enacted.60 The method used consisted of 
a  list  of  operations  subject  to  different  treatments,  ranging  from  a 
complete liberalization, to a partial or no liberalization at all (four lists, 
from A to D, were provided). A further review occurred in 1986,61 after 
that  in  the  previous  decade  the  process  had  substantially  stopped:  as 
acknowledged,  the  state  of  capital  movement  was  less  free  at  the 
beginning of the 1980s than it used to be few years after the sign of the 
Treaty  of  Rome.  A state  of  facts  which  convinced  Member  States  to 
launch the program for the completion of the internal market as it can be 
read in the White Book mentioned before.
The  Directive  88/361  was  instead  a  huge  leap  forward.  Although the 
wording of the Treaty did not change, the effect was striking.  All  the 
movements of capital were completely liberalized. No ambiguity could 
be possible: the debate as to whether the art. 67 EEC might have direct 
effect and consequently being relied on by individuals against the state, 
resolved by CJEU in the negative sense, was no longer actual. The new 
main  provision  (art.  1  of  the  Directive  88/361),  which  was  to  be 
incorporated finally in the Maastricht Treaty few years later, removed all 
doubts, as confirmed later on by the Court (see next section); at the same 
time, as already anticipated, the Annex attached to the Directive 88/361 
60 Council Directive 60/1/EEC of 11 May 1960 for the implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty, OJ 1960; Directive 63/21/EEC 
of 18 December 1962 adding to and amending the First Directive  for the implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty, OJ 1962 9/62 at 5; 
see also Usher, The Law of Money and Financial Services in European Community (n 5) 17
61 Council Directive 86/566/EEC, OJ L332/22
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provided clear indications as to what could be deemed capital movement.
A noteworthy aspect is the inclusion of the investments in the real estate, 
which beyond doubt fall within the scope of art. 63 TFEU, although from 
an economic point of view they do not constitute capital:62 an evident 
note that the notion of capital is to be construed in a extremely broad way 
and  not  limited  to  financial  operations,  but  encompassing  all  kind  of 
investments intended to generate a possible revenue. 
2.5 Current legal basis and role of the Directive 88/361 in the 
present framework
The rules currently in force are included in the Chapter 4 of the Title IV 
of the TFEU, from the art. 63, former art. 56 TEC (art. 73(b) before the 
adoption of the Treaty of Amsterdam), which reproduces in substance the 
content  of  the  art.  1  of  the  Directive  88/361.  Apart  from  being 
renumbered, no other significant changes have occurred in recent years.
The free movement of capital is placed among the other provisions of the 
Treaties, then on the top of the hierarchy, without the original limitations. 
Besides what has already been explained in the Chapter 1 (the intention 
to confer to this freedom the same value enjoyed by the other three) other 
reasons  suggested  the  incorporation  of  the  rule  provided  by  art.  1 
Directive 88/361 in the legal text of the TFEU: although a provision of a 
directive can be precise enough to have direct effect, such a possibility is 
residual and surrounded by limits such as the failure of a Member State 
to implement it or its inadequate implementation,  the exclusion of the 
horizontal  effect  (impossibility  to  plead  it  against  another  private 
individual),  arguments  that  cannot  be  put  forward in  relation  to  rules 
stemming from primary law.63 However, for the sake of completeness it 
must be said that no rulings over the possible horizontal direct effect of 
62 Hindelang, (n 4) 46
63 Usher, The Law of Money and Financial Services in European Community (n 5) 25
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art.  63  have  been  delivered  so  far  and  the  issue  is  still  debated.64 
However, it has been established that in the fields of services the relevant 
Treaty provisions can be relied on against private persons (such as trade 
unions or professional associations), therefore according to some scholars 
the  same  should  hold  true  with  regards  to  capital  movement,  being 
absolutely conceivable the conduct of financial institutions making the 
transfers more difficult.65
The  articles  from  64  to  66  introduce  some  limitations  and  possible 
restraints to the freedom, which is still viewed with suspicion as it can be 
inferred from the text: apart from the so-called grandfather clause under 
art.  64(1) (not really actual),  it  clearly appears that the caution of the 
drafters, albeit diminished, has not disappeared completely. Especially in 
the field of taxation (a topic excluded by this work) the question is still 
sensitive  (the  controversial  distinction  between  residents  and  non-
residents  based  on art.  65(1)(a));  moreover,  other  restrictions  may be 
temporarily reintroduced in case of serious disturbances to the monetary 
dimension, showing once more the unavoidable connections between free 
movement  of  capital  and  monetary  issues,  whose  details  will  be 
addressed in Chapter 3.
The Directive 88/361 is no longer in force, but the CJEU still refers to the 
“Nomenclature”,  as  plain  demonstrated  by  the  case-law  since  the 
beginning of the nineties.
One of the most peculiar aspects, which makes this freedom unique, is 
that the liberalization has been pursued not just in the intra-Union context 
but  also  towards  third  countries  (art.  63(2)).  Although  the  complex 
relationship between the Community (now Union) and third countries as 
regards  capital  movements  is  not  the  object  of  this  work  and  would 
deserve a separate dissertation due to the numerous problems which may 
result,  some  aspects  cannot  be  disregarded:  besides  the  economic 
64 Barnard (n 3) 566-567; Usher, The Law of Money and Financial Services in European Community (n 5) 27 seems to support this 
thesis.
65 Usher, The Law of Money and Financial Services in European Community (n 5) 27; Hindelang (n 4) 210-212: according to the 
author, horizontal direct effect is conceivable only against private persons with state-like powers and only as last resort.
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rationale (the intention to create a market as open as possible for foreign 
investors  and make European Union a competitive area on the global 
scenario), the openness is necessary in the light of the EMU, specifically 
in relation to the adoption of the single currency (the Euro). The topic 
will be illustrated in Chapter 3. It can be said here that in light of the 
project aimed at establishing a monetary union and a single currency, 
such a choice is recommended so as to assure the international investors 
as  to  the availability of  Euros,  to  grant  an access  to  market  with the 
certainty that no costs will be imposed on the reimportation of capital 
invested and finally with the aim to establish Europe as a global financial 
center.
2.6 Main legal issues and CJEU case-law
2.6.1 Liberalization of capital movements in general
One of the paramount points after the changes outlined in the previous 
paragraphs is the legal value of the art. 63 TFEU.
The  Casati judgement,  in  fact,  excluded  the  direct  effect  of  its 
predecessor, namely the art. 67 EEC given its formulation (see Chapter 
1);  the  situation  was  however  bound  to  change  after  1988  and  the 
Directive 88/361.
The response of the CJEU showed, as predictable, a complete turnaround 
of the approach followed until then by the European judges. The decision 
in the case Bordessa is exemplary: the CJEU ruled that the art. 1 of the 
Directive  88/361  required  all  restrictions  to  capital  movements  be 
abolished and the provision might be relied on by any individual. Some 
scholars remark how the Court's decision was based on the secondary 
legislation and thus it  did not  modify the nature of the corresponding 
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Treaty provision66 (not yet changed and characterized by the safeguard 
clause  that  liberalization  should  have been progressive  and limited  to 
what necessary to ensure the functioning of the internal market). Such an 
observation helps to understand why the incorporation in the Treaty was 
necessary, as it happened afterwards. A change of policy, in fact, might 
have  reversed  the  choice  to  liberalize  capital  movements  simply  by 
repealing or modifying the Directive itself,67 whereas the Treaty required 
unanimity and more complex procedures to be amended.
In the case Sanz de Lera, which came few years later from Spain, as well 
as  Bordessa, besides  being based on almost  identical  facts,  the CJEU 
confirmed the same outcome by referring this time to the relevant Treaty 
provision. 
Since  then,  the  Court  has  never  departed  from  such  a  conclusion; 
furthermore, besides this change, the attitude of CJEU has remarkably 
changed. The deference shown in the first years, in stark contrast with the 
rulings delivered as regards goods, persons and services, seems to have 
completely  vanished.  The  main  reasons  can  be  found,  alongside  the 
changed wording of the Treaty, in a different economic context and a new 
political scenario, much more favorable towards capital free circulation.68 
The caution that the CJEU showed in the  Casati case was grounded on 
concerns whose importance was seriously diminished.
The CJEU has regained its role in favor of the internal market, by striking 
down several national measures deemed inconsistent with the modified 
legal framework and with a strong attention on the application of the 
proportionality test. Even when a restriction might have been justified, 
the Court has stressed the duty not to limit the free movement more than 
necessary, by adopting a quite strict approach.
66 Murphy (n 2) 283
67 Ibid
68 Ibid 292-293
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2.6.2 Capital and payments: an outdated question
Another issue to which the CJEU has been called to provide a solution 
regards  the  somewhat  confused  relationship  between  capital  and 
payments.
An historical premise is again necessary: whereas movements of capital 
were only partially liberalized, and in any case on the basis of secondary 
legislation,  payments  were instead  freed since  the  beginning (art.  106 
EEC).
The question is nowadays outdated given the current legal framework, 
where capital and payments are placed on equal footing and subject to the 
same treatment (art. 63(2) TFEU). The only reason to distinguish these 
two figures lies in the different treatment conferred to capital in contrast 
to  the  other  freedoms  for  what  concerns  third  countries.  While  free 
movement of capital applies also when one party is located outside the 
EU, the same cannot be held for goods or services for example (see infra 
section 2.7).
The  criterion  that  has  been  used  can  be  found  in  the  case  Luisi  & 
Carbone.69 The CJEU draws the  distinction  in  the  following terms:  a 
payment,  unlike  a  movement  of  capital,  is  the  consideration  in  a 
synallagmatic  relationship.  In  other  words,  what  is  given in  return  of 
goods and services, while a movement of capital is characterized rather 
by an investment than remuneration. Such a solution has been heavily 
criticized by the doctrine for its ambiguity,70 making it  hard to decide 
whether it falls within one category or the other.71
The problem arose due to the different treatment illustrated above. Being 
in  force  the  rules  pre-Directive  88/361,  only  a  payment  could  be 
performed freely, where if the operation was regarded as a movement of 
69 Joined cases C-286/82 and C-26/83 [1984] ECR 377
70 Mohamed, European Community Law on the Free Movement of Capital and the EMU (n 6) 51
71 Usher, The Law of Money and Financial Services in European Community (n 5) 12: the distinction is hard to trace, for instance, 
with life insurance where part of the premium is intended partly to cover expenses and to pay the insurance itself (then a payment), but on  
the other hand also with an investment purpose (thus a capital movement).
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capital it was subject to the restrictions existing at that time.
Once removed all obstacles, the problem is way less important,  if not 
totally superfluous,  even though the concepts are different  and thus it 
may be worth being aware of that.
2.6.3 “Erga omnes” principle: free movement of capital and third countries
The most distinguishing feature of the freedom object of this work is its 
extension to  third countries.  Capital  movements  have been liberalized 
also when they are directed to, or are originated from, countries which 
are not part of EU. The effect is “erga omnes”.
This choice has been the outcome of long and complicate discussions 
between the Member States, with some of them afraid of the possible 
negative  effects  caused  by  eventual  massive  inflows  or  outflows  of 
capital from or towards countries extraneous to the integration process.72 
However, such a decision has an economic rationale. First it permits and 
facilitates  direct  investments  which  can  be  beneficial  to  Union's 
economy:  any investor  knows that  reimporting the capital  will  not  be 
subject  to  restrictions  or  limitations,  which  should  increase  the 
attractiveness of the European area. Then if such a rule did not exist, it 
would be easy to enter or exit the Union via the most liberal state,73 a 
situation which may create distortions and impairing the common level 
playing field to the detriment of single Member States, if not leading to a 
race  to  the  bottom  in  order  to  become  more  interesting  for  the 
investments. 
Finally,  in  the  view  of  establishing  a  monetary  union  and  a  single 
currency,  the  liberalization  towards  third  countries  is  an  essential 
assumption  to  reassure  the  economic  community  as  to  the  complete 
72 Bakker (n 8) 230
73 Snell (n 7) 564
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availability  of  Euros.74 The  monetary  relevance  of  this  choice  is 
underscored by the safeguards included in art. 66 TFEU, conferring to 
the Council the power to introduce restrictions to be applied in relation to 
third countries when serious difficulties for the functioning of economic 
and monetary union arise. Similar powers are provided for by art. 64(2) 
and 64(3), allowing a step backwards in certain circumstances or by art. 
65(4): such a provision is quite interesting, since it empowers the Council 
to assess the legality of a national measure restricting the free movement 
to and from third countries (even though only for tax purposes), a role 
which is generally incumbent upon the judicial body, the CJEU, and not 
the executive. All these cautions show how the matter is still viewed as 
sensitive and therefore the “erga omnes” principle, although accepted in 
theory, remains surrounded by suspicion and it is less categorical than it 
may appear.
The  CJEU  has  proven  quite  liberal  in  this  field,  by  ruling  that  the 
provision on the free movement of capital may be relied on also by those 
outside EU, thereby conferring direct effect in their regard. At the same 
time it is not relevant, as ruled in case  Sanz de Lera mentioned before, 
where the capital are directed given this peculiarity (in the case at issue 
third countries such as Switzerland and Turkey). However, despite this 
general assertion, the safeguards have not been completely ignored by the 
CJEU: in the ruling  A v. Skatteverket75 the Court first affirmed that the 
national  legislation (of Sweden in this case) was inconsistent with art. 63 
TFEU, which can be relied on regardless of the person invoking it resides 
inside or outside the Union, then it signaled that due to the difference of 
context  the  outcome might  be  different  in  third  country situations.  In 
practice, the CJEU tends to accept justifications for the restrictions which 
probably would not be deemed acceptable within the EU, like those of 
economic nature.76
74 Snell (n 7) 564; Usher, The Law of Money and Financial Services in European Community (n 5) 22-23; Usher, 'The Evolution of 
the Free Movement of Capital' (n 38) 1543
75 Case C-101/05 A v. Skatteverket [2007] ECR I-11531
76 Snell (n 7) 566-567
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2.6.4 The concept of restriction
2.6.4.1  The  (broad)  answer  of  the  CJEU:  beyond  the  concept  of 
discrimination
The liberalization implies the prohibition of restrictions to capital flows. 
As a general rule, it may be worth referring to the famous “Dassonville 
formula” and its impact: not just explicit and actual restrictions, but also 
those merely potential.77
In the field of capital the case-law of CJEU has been quite scarce for 
many years, as a consequence of the low degree of liberalization, and still 
now it is not as extensive as in other areas. In any case, some common 
features  can  be  identified,  bearing  in  mind  that  differences  in  the 
approach might occur and a clear rule such as that aforementioned has 
never been affirmed.78
Since the enactment of the Directive 88/361, the Court has taken a rigid 
stance,  more  in  compliance  with  its  attitude  in  favor  of  the  internal 
market. In most cases, a restriction has been described in an extremely 
broad way: any measure capable of deterring, or making less attractive a 
possible  investment  (in  general  one  of  the  operations  included in  the 
Nomenclature,  although  the  list  is  open  and  not  exhaustive)  is  to  be 
forbidden.79 At the same time all derogations are to be narrowly applied 
and never conceal economic ends.80
The Court has often used words such as 'liable to dissuade',  'liable to  
impede' or  has  found  to  be  inconsistent  rules  capable  of  imposing 
additional costs.81
77 Flynn (n 26) 783
78 Steve Peers, 'Free Movement of Capital: Learning Lessons or Slipping on Spilt Milk?' in Catherine Barnard and Joanne Scott  
(eds), The Law of the Single European Market: Unpacking the Premises (Hart Publishing, 2002) 342
79 Snell (n 7) 555
80 As it can be inferred from Case C-54/99, Eglise de Scientologie [2000] ECR I-1335, see Barnard (n 3) 585-586; Flynn (n 26) 
797
81 Hindelang (n 4) 119-121; Flynn (n 26) 780
36
Such an interpretation might be welcomed by all those who consider the 
free movement of capital a pillar of the common market, but at the same 
time it is not immune from criticisms. Firstly, instead than affirming a 
clear  rule,  the  CJEU  has  preferred  again  to  follow  an  incremental 
approach, namely by adding different hypotheses where the provisions of 
capital apply, with ad hoc judgements addressing individual situations.82
Some striking examples are drawn from the tax field. Once adopted this 
approach,  any  additional  burden  imposed  on  an  individual  might 
discourage  him  from  seeking  an  investment  and  therefore  be  not 
acceptable. The case  Sandoz83 seems to suggest this outcome:84 a stamp 
duty imposed on loans taken abroad, irrespective of where the lender was 
established  and  although  indistinctly  applicable  was  regarded  as  a 
restriction of the free movement of capital (eventually the measure was 
upheld since it complied with the derogation provided for by art. 65(1)
(b)).  The conclusion which can be drawn from this case is that every 
fiscal burden, in order to be upheld, has to be justified.85
Nevertheless,  it  is  obvious  that  in  such a  way the  fiscal  competence, 
which is still a competence of the Member States, might be considerably 
curtailed,  even though the justification put forward (by Austria in this 
case) was accepted. Probably that has triggered protests which may have 
had an influence over the Court;  the approach in recent cases appears 
more  cautious,  as  some scholars  have noticed,  at  least  in  the field  of 
taxation  where  the  prerogatives  of  the  Member  States  have  not  been 
transferred to the Union yet.86
Furthermore,  the  CJEU  has  never  developed  a  distinction  between 
discriminatory measures and other types of restrictions. The Court seems 
to  have  overlooked  the  problem,  and  the  analysis  of  the  case-law 
confirms  such a view:87 the  focus  is  always  on the possible  deterrent 
82 Peers (n 78) 342-343
83 Case C-439/97 [1999] ECR I-7041
84 Peers (n 78) 343
85 Flynn (n 26) 779
86 Snell (n 7) 567-573; Barnard (n 3) 577
87 Flynn (n 26) 782
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effect  without  assessing  if  there  is  a  discrimination,  either  direct  or 
indirect, or the measure is applicable without distinction. The approach 
could  be  deemed flawed,  since  even the  Treaty mentions  the  concept 
under art. 65(3), by stating that the express derogations therein provided 
'shall not constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination'. However, in a 
handful  of  cases  the  Court  mentions  the  concept  of  discrimination  or 
refers to it.88
As known, according to CJEU, while non-discriminatory restrictions may 
be justified by the existence of legitimate overriding interests,  the so-
called rule of reason test89 (and provided that the measure is suitable and 
proportionate,  thus  not  more  restrictive  than  necessary),  if  the 
discrimination  occurs  the  State  can  exclusively  rely  on  the  express 
derogations (and again respecting the principle of proportionality).90
The Court  should perhaps clarify its  stance,  still  too ambiguous.  It  is 
evident that in the field of capital to trace a line between discriminatory 
restrictions  (both  direct  and indirect)  and those  indistinctly applicable 
may be an arduous task. Unlike the origin on goods, for instance, or the 
nationality of the provider of a service,  to assign a provenience to an 
investment  might  be extremely complicate.91 Notwithstanding that,  the 
absence of criteria is hardly acceptable for the sake of a market based on 
clear rules;92 moreover, not having clarified such an aspect might lead to 
an  abuse  of  the  rule  of  reason  test,  with  states  invoking  mandatory 
unexpressed requirements in order to justify limitations which actually 
discriminate, thereby curtailing the free movement of capital. The strict 
application  of  the  proportionality  test  cannot  be  a  surrogate,  being 
conceptually  different  (it  is  not  to  be  applied  to  the  nature  of  the 
restricting measure, but only on whether the measure itself is suitable and 
88 Hindelang (n 4) 142-143: the cases C-302/97 Konle [1999] ECR I-3099 and C-423/98 Albore [2000] ECR I-5965 are among 
those. According to the author, on the basis of the existing case-law it is almost impossible to draw a clear line between an approach based  
on a non-discrimination test and the general tendency of the Court to refer to a more general assessment based on a restriction.
89 Ibid 261-268
90 Also in the field of capital movements, see again cases  Konle and Albore, see note 88 above, cited in Peers (n 78) 347
91 Ibid 344
92 Ibid 347-348
38
not excessive).
On the other hand, the adoption of a broad concept of restriction allows 
to  comprise several  types  measures,  even those  having different  aims 
such as the “golden-shares” rules.93
Other authors94 propose to apply either a test based on the market-access 
(as for goods, like in the cases Commission vs Italy95 as regards trailers or 
Mickelsson  & Ross96)  or  based  on  a  more  general  “adverse  effect”.97 
Although the first idea may sound intriguing, it does not seem to fit to 
capital markets; while a market-access approach works well with goods, 
it  is  hard  to  conceive  a  financial  market  with  the  same  features.  To 
explain it  clearly: if  free movement of capital  is necessary to allocate 
better the resources, not all the capital  providers compete in the same 
scenario.  A capital  seeker  might  need  some  resources  tailored  to  its 
specific  needs,  unlike  a  good  or  a  service  which  can  be  to  varying 
degrees interchangeable.98 Then the concept of access to a market might 
not make any real sense.
The “adverse effect”  appears  a more suitable criterion.  Following this 
approach, any measure whose effect is to deter or make less attractive a 
capital  movement  is  deemed  prohibited,  regardless  of  possible 
discrimination or the scope of the measure itself.
2.6.4.2 Territorial scope of the freedom
In  order  for  the  rules  on  free  movement  of  capital  to  be  applied  (or 
invoked), the practical situation must fall within their scope.
A cross-border  element  is  then  essential,  having  the  Treaty  rules  no 
93 Barnard (n 3) 572 in which one of the “golden shares” cases is mentioned: case C-367/98 Commission v. Portugal [2002] ECR 
I-4731. The Court claims that the scope of art. 63 'goes beyond the mere elimination of unequal treatment, on grounds of nationality, as  
between operators on the financial market' (par. 44)
94 Horsley (n 50) 170-174
95 Case C-110/05 [2009] ECR I-519
96 Case C-142/05 [2009] ECR I-4273
97 Peers (n 78) 345
98 Ibid
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bearing in case of wholly internal situations.99
The case-law shows how this concept has been construed broadly as well, 
by excluding only cases where no extraneous elements were present at 
all.  It  may appear  as a  further  indication of  the CJEU's attitude post-
Maastricht, as an attempt to review the legality of as many measures as 
possible. A cross-border border situation, in fact, may occur even when 
both the provider and the recipient are located in the same country.100
2.7 Relationship with other freedoms, with particular attention 
on services: an unsolved dilemma
2.7.1 Can two freedoms compete with each other or not?
The absence of an express definition of capital, along with the lack of 
clarity by CJEU leads inevitably to a problem as to the qualification to 
give in doubtful cases.
The notion of movement of capital, and the consequent application of the 
relevant rules, may often overlap with other situations covered by other 
provisions in the EU legal framework.
The most evident example is offered by the relationship between capital 
and freedom of establishment (art. 49 TFEU): the acquisition of shares in 
a  company,  for  instance,  can  represent  either  a  portfolio  investment 
(where the investor's aim is to obtain a profit in terms of dividends) or the 
intention  to  take  over  an  undertaking,  by  gaining  influence  over  the 
management.101 Admitted  that,  in  theory,  both  freedoms  seem  to  be 
applicable, which one prevails? Or is the situation to be analyzed from 
both angles?
99 Hindelang (n 4) 60-63
100 Case C-67/08 Block v. Finanzamt Kuafbeuren [2009] ECR I-883, see Barnard (n 3) 564
101 Ibid 568
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The freedom to provide services is to be taken into account as well. To 
qualify the circumstances in an appropriate way is not always an easy 
exercise.
Before going into details as regards the relationship between services and 
capital, which will be the object of the next section, the first question is to 
be  answered,  namely  whether  two  freedoms  may  compete  with  each 
other or not. If the answer were the latter, it would then be reasonable to 
set out the criteria to decide in a predictable manner which one takes 
over.
That being so,  it  must be disappointing to  find out how the solutions 
provided by CJEU are not satisfactory. The Court, in a similar way to that 
described before concerning the definition of capital, prefers to address 
the issue with ad hoc solutions, sometimes even sidestepping it.
In the Svensson102 case the Court conclude that both rules on services and 
capital are to be applied, while in Sandoz it relied only on the latter.103
Such  an  approach  is  attacked  by AG Tesauro  in  the  case  Safir,104 by 
suggesting in his opinion that the two concepts should be kept separated 
by  adopting  a  narrower  concept  of  capital  (but  the  Court  eventually 
resorted only to art. 49 TEC, now art. 56 TFEU).
From AG's point of view, when two freedoms apparently collide, i.e. both 
may be invoked, it must be assessed the nature of the restrictive measure. 
In other words, whether it consists of an intrinsically monetary restraint, 
affecting capital, or whether the restrictive effects are only an inevitable 
consequence of the limitations of another freedom.105 Such an approach 
resembles  the  Court's  decision  in  the  Bachmann106 case,  a  judgement 
delivered pre-Maastricht and pre-Directive 88/361, where it was affirmed 
that rules on free movement of capital did not prohibit restrictions which 
resulted  indirectly  from  restrictions  of  other  freedoms.107 The  ruling 
102 Case C-484/93, Svensson & Gustafsson v. Ministre du Logement [1995] ECR I-3955
103 Snell (n 7) 568
104 Case C-118/96 [1998] ECR I-1897
105 Flynn (n 26) 778 and 791
106 Case C-204/90 [1992] ECR I-249
107 Peers (n 78) 338
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remained an isolated case though.
The assessment of a national measure on the basis of its alleged nature, 
so-called “centre of gravity” attitude, is a questionable judgement; every 
member state could simply conceal the measure at issue, by framing it 
with  a  particular  language,  and  thereby  escaping  the  stricter  Treaty 
rules.108 On  the  other  hand  the  suggestion  has  the  merit  to  draw  a 
hypothetical line in cases where the qualification is unsettled.
However, recent case-law shows the inclination of the CJEU to privilege 
one freedom,109 or to require that the case be examined under one and 
only if the first turns out to be inappropriate take into account the latter.
As of today, no solution has prevailed. The decision to apply one (and 
only one) is questionable. According to some authors, the Treaties seem 
to  suggest  a  parallel  application,110 given  the  fact  also  that  all  the 
freedoms are fundamental principles of the internal market and therefore 
it is hardly comprehensible why one should be sacrificed being absent 
more express criteria.111 The wording of the Treaty seems to suggest this 
approach,  given  for  example  the  cross  references  between  art.  49(2) 
TFEU ('... subject to the Chapter relating to Capital') and art. 65(2) ('The 
provisions  of  this  chapter  shall  apply  without  prejudice  to  the  
applicability of restrictions on the right of establishment...'): by applying 
the  exclusive  approach,  these  references  would  become  totally 
superfluous.112 A primacy cannot be inferred in favor of one freedom.113 
All freedoms cover different aspects of the economic activities, therefore 
to limit the assessment of national measures allegedly inconsistent on the 
basis only on one might reduce the effectiveness of EU law and, with 
regards  to  to  capital  in  particular,  seriously  risk  to  nullify  the  “erga 
omnes”  principle  by opening the  way to  unjustified  restrictions  when 
108 Hindelang (n 4) 100
109 Barnard, (n 3) 568
110 Snell (n 7) 110
111 Flynn (n 26) 787: the author seems to view the freedom to provide services as subordinate though.
112 Snell (n 7) 569
113 Hindelang (n 4) 89
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third countries are involved114 (see next section).
At the same time, especially in cases involving third countries, the free 
movement  of  capital  should  be  the  correct  reference115 due  to  its 
peculiarity, whichever approach were adopted. 
2.7.2 Capital and services: the case of financial services and banking
For  the  scope of  this  study,  the  freedom to  provide  services  (art.  56 
TFEU) gains prominence. 
The sector of banking and financial services, in fact, may fall within the 
scope of both. As written in the first chapter, the free movement of capital 
is  necessarily  complementary,  given  that  its  absence  would  impair 
seriously  the  freedom  to  provide  services.  It  is  hard  to  conceive  a 
common market in the financial services with capital restrictions still in 
force,  since  most  of  the  financial  operations  involve  movements  of 
capital.
The two freedoms are therefore deeply intertwined, as also confirmed by 
art.  58(2) TFEU: the liberalization of banking services connected with 
capital movement are to be pursued in parallel with the liberalization of 
capital.  Considering that such a provision has been included since the 
very  beginning,  it  must  be  inferred  that  the  European  legislator  has 
always been aware of that.
For legal purposes, however, knowing which rules are to be applied is 
equally important to ensure a fair level playing field for all competitors, 
eliminating the grey areas  which may be dangerous for a harmonious 
development of the market itself. As the recent crisis has demonstrated, 
nothing causes more harm than uncertainty.
The most relevant case is without doubt the Fidium Finanz ruling:116 the 
CJEU ruled that a company providing financial services whose seat was 
114 Ibid 111
115 Snell (n 7) 569 572
116 Case C-452/04 [2006] ECR I-9521
43
located  outside  EU  (Switzerland)  is  not  entitled  to  rely  on  the  free 
movement of capital  because the freedom to provide services was the 
only relevant.  Eventual  restrictions on capital  were a secondary effect 
and since the extension to third countries does not apply for services, the 
plaintiff was denied the protection of the Treaty provisions.
The decision was controversial and sparked off criticisms.117 The Court 
noted that both freedoms were affected but, by analyzing the content of 
the national measure at issue, it eventually ruled that free movement of 
capital was secondary, being the adverse effect occurred nothing than an 
unavoidable  consequences  of  the  restriction  on  services.  The 
compatibility with art. 63 was not addressed. The CJEU took in any case 
a clear stance by stating that, notwithstanding the apparent “hierarchy” 
which would place the freedom to provide services on the bottom due to 
its  residual  character  (art.  57  TFEU  states  that  “services”  are  to  be 
deemed such 'insofar they are not governed by the provisions relating to  
freedom  of  movement  of  goods,  persons  and  capital'),  such  an 
interpretation cannot be accepted.118
The question remains substantially open. The relevant cases examined in 
the previous section, such as  Svensson  or  Safir, do not seem to give a 
clear  guidance.  Other  rulings  appear  even  contradictory:  while  in  the 
already mentioned Trummer & Mayer the CJEU asserted that a mortgage 
fell within the scope of art. 63 (at that time art. 56 TEC) although it was 
connected to the grant of a loan (a service) and so it ruled, in the case 
Ambry119 a financial security included in the Nomenclature was instead 
assessed under art. 49 TEC.120
It  has  been  suggested  that  the  shift  in  the  approach  is  grounded  on 
economic  reasons,  namely the  unwillingness  of  the Member States  to 
117 Hindelang (n 4) 99: the author attacks the approach followed by the CJEU by defining it “fuzzy and vague”; at p. 96, he also  
reports the words of the AG Stix-Hackl 'if reliance on art. 56 [now 63] in relation to undertakings in third country were automatically to  
be ruled out whenever another fundamental freedom is involved because of the subject matter in question, the guarantees provided by the  
free movement of capital would be meaningless' (par. 74)
118 Snell (n 7) 569
119 Case C-410/96 [1998] ECR I-1897
120 Usher, The Law of Money and Financial Services in European Community (n 5) 98; Peers (n 78) 339-340
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permit the extension to third countries of the Treaties freedoms via the 
backdoor of the free movement of capital.121
Five areas can be identified nowadays where the CJEU applies the rules 
on capital alone: property purchase and investment, currency and other 
financial transactions, loans, investment where those affected do not have 
a dominant interest in the company, the “golden shares” cases.122
121 Barnard (n 3) 568-569
122 Ibid
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3  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  (EMU)  and  the 
inextricable link with the free movement of capital
3.1 Introduction
This  study  has  been  focusing  in  the  first  two  chapters  on  the  free 
movement of capital by illustrating its fundamental characteristics along 
with  its  unavoidable  peculiarities,  which  make  it  absolutely  unique 
among the freedoms laid down in the Treaties.
One  of  the  aspects  mentioned  several  times  has  been  the  close 
connections  with  the  monetary  dimension  and  the  impact  that  the 
liberalization of capital may have (and which have had) in the sphere of 
the economic policies of the Union and the Member States.
The EMU, which stands for “economic and monetary union” (and not 
“european monetary union”) is a project launched at the same time of the 
decision to step forward and confer to the free movement of capital the 
value that it could not enjoy until then. As said, there is a rationale behind 
it still visible today, even though the project itself has constantly been 
under stark criticisms, especially in the last years of turbulences.
This chapter will try, on the basis of the notions previously outlined to 
address  these  issues  and  explain  why  the  links  between  capital  and 
monetary dimension are extremely tight and are to be seriously taken into 
account in the pursuit of a more efficient integrated market.
3.2  The  “impossible  trinity”:  free  movement  of  capital, 
monetary policy and fixed exchange rate.
The  liberalization  of  capital  has  been  a  complex  process,  highly 
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influenced  by  economic  and  political  considerations  and  generally 
speaking often seen more as a danger to stability than an opportunity. 
However,  despite  a  vivid  debate,  it  has  been  acknowledged  how  the 
development  of  internal  market,  if  not  the  European  project  globally 
considered, would have reached a stalemate in absence of such a move.
The best way to understand the terms of the question lies once again in 
the  economic  field,  first  and  foremost  in  a  figure  which  has  been 
thoroughly analyzed: the “impossible trinity”. What is it?
According to economists, three element cannot be combined at the same 
time:  free  movement  of  capital,  an  independent  monetary  policy  and 
fixed exchange rates. At least one of them has to give in if the others are 
to be pursued.123
Without spending too much words on the topic, which can be extremely 
complicate  and  knowing  that  a  certain  degree  of  approximation  is 
inevitable, the monetary policy deals with the setting of the interest rate. 
As explained in the Chapter 1, some Member States (France has been one 
of them, while Germany or the Netherlands for example have usually had 
a  more  liberal  approach)  have  contrasted  capital  liberalization  putting 
forward different kind of arguments and fears. One argument is that, in 
presence of free flow of capitals, the power to set an autonomous interest 
rate would have been irremediably compromised. Inbound and outbound 
flows force, in fact, the Central Bank of a country to adjust it,124 leading 
to  results  not  always  seen  as  the  best  choice  by  governments  (for 
instance, a high rate renders loans less affordable with an impact on the 
economy, but not adjusting it may lead to inflation, which might be even 
more  dangerous).  To prevent  such an effect,  the  Member  States  have 
advocated the use of capital controls. By impeding capital to leave the 
country (in search of better yield abroad) or by stopping massive inflows 
capable of having destabilizing effects, a margin of maneuver remains to 
the detriment of a more efficient allocation of resources, which is instead 
123 Charles Wyplosz, 'EMU: Why and How It May Happen' (Fall 1997), Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 11, no. 7, p. 3 3-4
124 Hindelang (n 4) 21
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one of the main goals of capital liberalization.
The exchange rate is the other element of the triad. Until the demise of 
Bretton Woods system, the currencies were all pegged to US Dollar with 
fixed rates. The existence of such an agreement is one of the cause, as 
mentioned, of the caution adopted by the original Treaty drafters with 
regards  to  capital  movements,  along  with  the  omission  of  rules 
concerning monetary aspects.  Nobody in  1957 could  predict  that  less 
than twenty years later the system would be abandoned due to changed 
economic conditions.
If currencies are not fixed, they float freely, but this situation has never 
been accepted by European governments,  especially those of  Member 
States  whose  public  finances  are  not  sound.  The  main  problem with 
floating is  that  it  harms certainty,  thereby it  may seriously impair  the 
functioning of the internal market: floating currencies means transaction 
costs, imbalances within the Community (before it became Union) and 
distortions in competition, being absent an identical level playing field, 
and in the long run such problems were seen as unsustainable.125
3.3  Why  free  movement  of  capital  is  so  important  for  the 
single market and EMU (and vice-versa): a single currency as 
a (unavoidable?) solution
All these reasons have been pleaded to justify the maintaining of capital 
controls, notwithstanding it was questioned whether they were beneficial. 
Member States wanted to retain a margin of maneuver in the monetary 
field,  in order to apply the policies considered more suitable for each 
single country, and at the same time avoiding excessive if not dramatic 
tensions on the exchange rates. The monetary competence had been for 
centuries one of the prerogatives of sovereignty, therefore its surrender 
125 Wyplosz (n 123) 4: the author mentions the trade wars which were among the causes of the Second World War.
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has become acceptable only in recent years. In light of these assumptions, 
the free movement of capital had been set aside for long.
However, different other plans were devised. The most important was the 
establishment of the “snake” and the European Monetary System in the 
1970s,  with  a  possible  oscillations  of  the  single  currencies  part  of  it 
within a limited range, with room for some derogations. It is remarkable 
to note, however, that a first project of monetary union already appears in 
that decade: the original schedule set the 1980 as the year for the launch 
(see section 3.5 infra).
The  idea  was  shelved  due  to  many  reasons,  mainly  political,  but  it 
demonstrates that the EMU has roots which date back in the past.
With the decision  to  resume the  market  integration  and the  choice to 
finally liberalize capital movements, the problem returned to the surface: 
one of the remaining elements of the “trinity”, either the monetary policy 
or the fixed exchange rate, was to be abandoned. The choice fell on the 
latter,  which  explains  why  the  EMU  project,  which  would  have 
eventually led to the single currency (the Euro), was commenced together 
with the Directive 88/361.
The idea of leaving the currencies floating was never considered. It was 
thought  that  such  a  situation  would  have  create  enormous  problems, 
especially  in  connection  with  the  free  movement  of  capital.  Once 
accepted that capital can move without obstacles, the strain on exchange 
rates may become unbearable (one of the causes of the crisis in 1992, 
which hit seriously two member countries such as United Kingdom and 
Italy,  was in fact that all  capital  movement had been liberalized126).  It 
must be borne in mind that in the previous directives, by means of which 
the  first  attempts  to  liberalize  capital  were  carried  out,  while  some 
operations  were  allowed,  a  prohibition  had  remained  for  short-term 
movements since they were viewed with extreme suspicion and fruit of 
speculation.  There  are  furthermore  serious  doubts  as  to  a  possible 
126 Sideek Mohamed, European Financial Services Law (Juridiska Fakulteten Skrifterien – Stockholms Universitet, no. 68, 2001) 
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compatibility  between  free-floating  currencies  and  an  area  without 
borders,127 as  EU aims  to  be:  protectionist  measures  are  likely  to  be 
adopted in that case.128
The historical context clarifies some aspects. Unrest in the exchange rates 
had occurred in the previous years, despite the EMS. The system was 
probably ill-devised,  since it  fixed the rates but not completely;129 the 
choice is, in fact, either a permanent fixing, with no oscillation at all, or 
free floating. Intermediate solution proved ineffective and the resort to 
capital controls did not solve the problems (on the effect of controls see 
infra). Currency crises continued to repeat.
On the other hand, over the course of the years Germany had imposed as 
the strongest and more stable economy of Europe; many other states were 
compelled  to  follow  the  policy  pursued  by  its  central  bank,  the 
Bundesbank, known for its independence from the government130 and its 
strong focus on price stability.  By adopting the same interest rate,  the 
states  which  did  so  substantially  renounced  to  their  monetary 
autonomy.131
It appeared clear how the completion of internal market, or at least a huge 
step forward towards a tighter integration capable of bolstering economic 
growth,132 required alongside the liberalization of capital a strategy aimed 
at thwarting the possible negative effects which might have ensued.133
As mentioned above, such an awareness was present since the inception 
of  the  Community,  but  the  conditions  necessary  to  implement  an 
ambitious project such as EMU were lacking. The positive conjuncture in 
the  1980s,  after  the  turmoils  of  the  previous  decade,  made  it  finally 
possible.
127 The EESC warned that the liberalization of capital was to be taken in parallel with other measures, including those concerning 
the monetary dimension, see Usher, The Law of Money and Financial Services in European Community (n 5) 20
128 Wyplosz (n 123) 18; Fabrizio Saccomanni, 'Verso una Vera Unione Economica e Monetaria? [Towards a Real Economic and 
Monetary Union?]', speech held at the Conference in memory of Gaspare Scaruffi, Reggio Emilia (Italy), 10 th January 2013 4
129 Mohamed, European Financial Services Law (n 126) 81-82
130 Bakker (n 8) 218-219: the author suggests that the EMU as it has been conceived was also a reaction of France to the domain of  
Bundesbank in setting the interest rate for Europe as a whole.
131 Wyplosz (n 123) 5-6
132 An analysis of the advantages of monetary integration can be found in Molle (n 17) 269
133 Wyplosz (n 123) 6
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The  capital  and  monetary  dimensions  are  thus  interwoven.134 That 
appears in the wording of the rules governing the former, as shown in the 
previous chapter: the decision to liberalize the movements also with third 
countries, the existence of safeguard clauses in case of disturbances. But 
also the CJEU itself recognized that in the landmark Casati ruling.
The  free  movement  of  capital  has  a  strong  bearing  on  monetary 
sovereignty  and  its  implementation  has  led  to  the  start  of  the  EMU. 
Although the judgement on the process can vary depending on the author, 
there is unanimity as to the connection between these two dimensions.
As known, one of the main points of the EMU was the introduction of a 
single currency (the Euro).  The purpose of this  work is  not to take a 
stance  as  to  whether  such  an  idea  has  been  a  success  or  not,  nor  to 
examine the political reasons in favor or against it. It must be noted that 
this  final  passage  is  not  necessarily  related  to  the  free  movement  of 
capital:135 a  monetary  union  can  be  achieved  simply  by  permanently 
fixing  the  exchange  rates.  While  a  single  currency  presupposes  a 
permanent parity, its adoption is not an automatic consequence but rather 
a political choice.
However,  the  adoption  of  a  single  currency  may  bring  strong 
advantages.136 Firstly,  it  removes  the  transaction  costs  typical  of  the 
currency conversion, thereby favoring the movements between member 
states;  secondly,  it  also removes the risks  connected to  exchange rate 
which  often prompt  the investors  to  hedge their  investments.137 When 
such a need is no longer actual, the effect might be a further downward 
pressure of the cost of capital. Due to lesser needs to hedge, the amount 
134 John A. Usher, 'The Evolution of the Economic and Monetary Union – Some Legal Issues' in Anthony Arnull, Piet Eeckhout, 
and Takis Tridimas (eds), Continuity and Change in EU Law: Essays in Honour of Sir Francis Jacobs (Oxford Scholarship Online, 2009) 
297-298; Hindelang (n 4) 19: free movement of capital is described as a part of the “magic square” made up of the Common Market and 
the establishment of EMU which contributes to the attainment of the goals set out in the Treaties.
135 Peers (n 78) 337
136 Molle (n 17) 269: the author seems however not to distinguish between monetary union and the adoption of a single currency,  
probably considering the latter the most likely outcome (as it appears from page 271); Mohamed, European Financial Services Law (n 
126) 91 views the single currency as a deterrence against turmoils of exchange rates.
137 Andrew Gamble, 'EMU and European Capital Markets: Towards a Unified Financial Market' (1991), Kluwer Law International,  
no. 28, p. 319  320
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of savings at disposal is bound to rise.138
Lastly, but not less important, it consolidates the EMU itself, a process 
which is deemed irreversible and surely the replacements of the national 
currencies with a new one make it way harder to step back.
Other implications, such as the debated questions as to the need to move 
towards an economic-political union are not the object of this study, but 
of course are not to be underestimated. 
In any case, some points are to be remembered: the free movement of 
capital  requires  a  change  in  the  paradigm  linking  the  monetary 
sovereignty to the state,139 on the other hand a Monetary union without 
the free movement of capital is hardly conceivable, regardless of a single 
currency is  to  be  adopted  or  it  consists  only of  fixing  the  respective 
exchange rates.140
3.4 Restrictions of the freedom: capital controls
With all these things in mind, once understood why capital controls have 
extensively been used in the past until the advent of EMU, this section 
will explain what they actually are, being a category which comprises 
different solutions.
3.4.1 Definition
The term “control” is common in the literature, but it is quite general. 
The CJEU, as seen in the Chapter 2, prefers to use “restrictions”, namely 
all measures liable to dissuade, deter, impede an individual (regardless of 
138 Kerk Phillips and Jeffrey Wrase, 'Monetary Union and Market Integration: Capital and Goods Market Issues Pertaining to the  
Launch of the Euro' (2001), International Finance Review, European Monetary Union and Financial Markets, vol. 2, p. 3  7
139 Barnard (n 3) 592
140 Art. 116(2)(a) TEC, repealed by Lisbon Treaty. It was a legal precondition of entry into the second stage of EMU, see also 
Murphy (n 2) 293
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natural or legal person) from seeking capital outside the state where he 
resides. It is also important to remember that neither the Treaties nor the 
Court have defined with precision what a restriction can be.
In any case the two terms are not synonyms, although they may overlap: 
a restriction can be even a measure whose aim is not to interfere with the 
movement of capital, but despite that affecting it. The “golden shares” 
cases are a perfect example: the reason why states wish to retain control, 
or have powers which could not be exercised in absence of the special 
rules, over state-owned or co-owned undertakings may in fact be many 
and  not  motivated  by  monetary  or  financial  concerns  (for  example, 
maintaining influence over certain industrial sectors whose important is 
deemed strategic). It might be inappropriate to refer to them as “capital 
controls” but they are doubtless restrictions and then they are caught by 
the rules of the Treaties.
The distinction in practice does not have a real relevance. Whatever is the 
ground for introducing limits to the free circulation of capital, the current 
framework forbids them unless they can be objectively justified, with the 
grounds for this exception interpreted narrowly by CJEU.
3.4.2 Types of controls
Admitted that all restrictions are prohibited in general, the present section 
will try to outline the different kind of controls which have been used in 
the past  for the purposes above explained, in light  of the “impossible 
trinity”.
An exhaustive list cannot be drawn up.141 The case-law in this area, but 
also  as  regards  goods,  services  and  persons  shows  that  the  ways  to 
impose restraints are basically infinite.142 Some recurring features are to 
be identified though.
141 Andrew  Yianni,  Carlos  de  Vera,  'The  Return  of  Capital  Controls'  (Fall  2010),  73  Law  and  Contemporary  Problems,  
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol73/iss4/23  358
142 A thorough description can be found in Bakker (n 8) 11-14
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One of the most common controls is the request of authorization to carry 
out an operation. The CJEU had to deal several times with this type of 
control:  the  famous  cases  Bordessa and  Sanz  de  Lera,  mentioned  in 
Chapter 1 and 2, both regarded a prosecution of individuals for having 
allegedly smuggled money in form of banknotes outside the country at 
issue (Spain) without having been previously authorized.
The Court, besides ruling over the direct effect of the relevant provisions 
(the  art.  1  of  the  Directive  88/361  and  art.  56  of  TEC  respectively 
applicable) also stated that the authorization regime, even though it was 
justified by mandatory requirements, was excessive and thus in breach of 
the principle of proportionality; it went on to say that a declaration could 
have  been  more  suitable.  Such  decisions  triggered  the  debate  as  to 
whether requiring an authorization is always deemed unacceptable.143 In 
other cases the CJEU clarified its stance, by adding that in some limited 
cases an authorization could be saved, but only if certain criteria were 
provided, more specifically the possibility for any individual to know in 
advance the situations where such a request is necessary.144
Other  measures  often  adopted,  and brought  to  the Court's  review,  are 
related  to  taxation:  limits  to  deductions,  impossibility  to  avail  of 
allowances. They discourage investors and thereby hinder capital flows.
The State  could also impose that,  in  order  for  some operations  to  be 
performed, certain fees have to be paid or guarantees be provided.
In  some  cases  the  restriction  is  explicitly  aimed  at  curb  the  flow of 
capital,  while  in  other  the  approach  followed  is  more  subtle  and  the 
measures are “covert”.
143 Mohamed, European Community Law on the Free Movement of Capital and the EMU (n 6) 102: the author criticizes, in light of 
Bordessa and Sanz de Lera rulings, the approach followed by CJEU by expressing doubts as to the effectiveness of a mere declaration to 
contrast crimes such as money laundering for instance.
144 Barnard (n 3) 583, with reference to one of the “golden shares” cases, C-367/98 Commission v. Portugal [2002] ECR I-4731
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3.4.3 Why they have been used
It has been explained and clarified why Member States have been so keen 
to maintain such controls for a long time. Capital controls have been for 
long an instrument of monetary policy, enabling the states to pursue their 
own choices, i.e. an autonomous policy, in conditions which would not 
have been possible in presence of free capital flows. It must be said that, 
although  controls  have  been  used  by  all  states  throughout  time,  the 
degree of restriction differs considerably between countries more liberal 
(Germany or the Netherlands) and others more favorable to them (France 
in primis).145
Many further reasons have been put forward, such as the need to contrast 
speculation or the fear that free movement of capital would have entailed 
a drain-off of the national resources in favor of other countries, with a 
consequent impact on tax revenues (see Chapter 1).
Despite their general prohibition, capital controls are suggested in order 
to avoid phenomena such as “bank runs”, namely when the depositors 
withdraw their money with the effect that the banks often go bankrupt for 
lack of liquidity. The Cyprus case seems to be particularly actual for this 
purpose  (but  also  Iceland,  which  is  outside  EU,  resorted  to  capital 
controls in 2009 to prevent a collapse of its own currency, still in force 
despite their alleged negative effects on the economic growth146).
3.4.4 Inefficiency of capital controls. Reasons not to resort to controls in 
light of historical experience.
Capital controls have proven inefficient on the basis of the experience. 
145 Mads Andenas, Christos Hadjiemmanuil, 'Banking Supervision, the Internal Market and European Monetary Union', in Mats 
Andenas, Laurence Gormley, Christos Hadjiemmanuil,  Ian Harden (eds),  European Economic and Monetary Union: the Institutional  
Framework (Kluwer Law International, 1997) 379-380
146 Yianni, de Vera (n 141) 368; see also  Mattias Mauritzon, 'Islands stora utmaningar kvarstår [Iceland big challenges remain]' 
Dagens Industri (Stockholm, 5 March 2013)
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Although their extensive use, many reasons suggest to avoid resorting to 
them again in the future unless in extreme circumstances.
Capital  controls  are  potentially  harmful,  because  they  may  generate 
distortions and therefore a misallocation of resources. Besides that, they 
have a cost to adopt and make them work, since administrative measures 
are  required  (such  as  issuing  authorizations  or  ascertaining  that  the 
provisions are not circumvented); the evolution in the field of technology, 
moreover, renders controls much more difficult if not even pointless.147
Secondly, they entail a higher cost for the capital itself. If investors or 
undertakings are precluded from seeking the best return because of the 
restrictions, they will thus be forced to pay more for obtaining the capital, 
which  may  cause  several  negative  consequences  such  as  the  loss  of 
competitiveness  or  a  diminution  of  profits.  These  effects  may have  a 
repercussion  on  fiscal  revenues,  a  further  downward  pressure  on  the 
exchange  rate  which  may call  for  tighter  restrictions  and  so  on  in  a 
vicious circle.
Lastly, capital controls may have negative effect on fiscal discipline and 
delay the adoption of important reforms.148 It is easier to restrict capital 
flows than to tackle the economic issues which constantly arise.
As said, their use have been invoked against the speculation, especially 
that involving currencies and the exchange rate. The idea was to prevent 
turbulent swings but most of the time they occurred despite the attempts 
to  curb  the  speculative  attacks,  therefore  their  effectiveness  has  been 
seriously  questioned.149 The  introduction  of  controls  may  furthermore 
reinforce  the  negative  opinion  of  the  market  actors  towards  a  certain 
state,  thereby triggering tensions  on its  exchange rate  and leading the 
investors to seek safe harbors with the inevitable consequence to worsen 
the economic situation more than what would have happened in absence 
of them.150
147 Bakker (n 8) 188
148 Yianni, de Vera (n 141) 359
149 Hindelang (n 4) 20
150 Hindelang (n 4) 21-22
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3.4.5  Would  it  be  possible  to  revert  to  capital  controls  in  the  current 
framework? Legal and economic issues
The history of free movement of capital have had different phases. The 
initial momentum, dating back in the 1960s, was not maintained.151 Only 
in  1988,  and  subsequently  in  the  Maastricht  Treaty,  the  liberalization 
became  definitive.  Following  this  shift,  the  CJEU  abandoned  the 
deference shown in the first decades and started to apply for capital the 
same tests it had been using in relation to the other freedoms laid down in 
the Treaties.
Steps  back are hardly conceivable:  safeguards  are  provided only with 
regards to third countries (see back section 2.6.3), while it does not seem 
possible to reintroduce capital controls between the Member States.152 
However, as known only a certain number of States have joined EMU 
and adopted Euro (as of today, 17 out 27): are the “outs” to be treated 
differently?  The  answer  is  clearly  no.  Although  they retain  monetary 
policy,  they  are  subject  to  the  rules  of  the  Treaties,  including  those 
regarding capital. They could never be assimilated to third countries.153 
The main difference is represented by the powers which they may avail 
of in case of serious disturbances in the balance of payment, however 
surrounded by numerous cautions.154
That  being  so,  it  is  impossible  at  the moment (spring 2013) to  know 
whether  and how the  CJEU will  assess  the  restrictions  introduced by 
Cyprus' government in March 2013 in order to deal with its bank crisis, 
being it the first time in history where a country which does not have its 
own currency resorts to capital controls.155
151 Ibid 34-35
152 Bakker (n 8) 261-262: the author lists legal, economic and political reasons against them, mentioning also their “placebo effect”  
(257); Mohamed, European Community Law on the Free Movement of Capital and the EMU (n 6) 99
153 John A. Usher. 'Legal Background of the Euro',  in Paul Beaumont and Neil Walker (eds),  Legal Framework of the Single  
European Currency (Hart Publishing, 1999) 29-30; Usher, The Law of Money and Financial Services in European Community (n 5) 203
154 Art. 143-144 TFEU
155 According to Murphy (n 2) 298-300 the CJEU should return to the self-restraint it used to have before 1988 in situations of 
crisis, given that the choices are mainly political and not legal.
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3.5 EMU's legal framework and historical background
The idea of monetary union is not a product of the last twenty years.156 
The Spaak Report, drafted at the beginning of the integration experience, 
already highlighted the connections between free movement of capital 
and the establishment of such an union as a necessary consequence.157 
The CJEU, by adopting its self-restraint in the  Casati ruling, implicitly 
agreed with this view.
A first  concrete  step  occurred  between the  end of  the  1960s  and  the 
beginning of 1970s: the Werner Report, published in 1971, suggested a 
move  towards  a  monetary  union  by  indicating  some  fundamental 
passages  which were to  be followed.  The Institutions  then prepared a 
preliminary plan according to which the launch of the EMU should have 
taken place in 1980, approximately ten years later. One of the relevant 
aspects was, of course, the liberalization of all movements of capital.
The main problem with such a plan was that it became soon outdated. 
The collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the subsequent tensions in 
the exchange rates, which started to float freely, contributed to its failure. 
The idea of the Werner Report to build a monetary union in a smooth 
way was grounded on unstable foundations, namely the existence of the 
system of fixed rates which had been prevailing until then.
Less  ambitious  plans  were  proposed  subsequently,  based  on  the 
awareness  that  exchange fluctuations  were detrimental  to  an economy 
already afflicted by serious troubles (such as the oil crisis, to mention the 
most remarkable): first the so-called “snake”, in 1972, whose idea was 
resumed few years later (1978) with the establishment of the EMS. In 
both cases, narrow margins of fluctuation were set, usually around 2.25% 
save exceptions (the Italian Lira was granted a broader swing equal to 
6%).
156 The history of EMU from an economist's point of view can be found in Molle (n 17) 271-274
157 Mohamed, European Community Law on the Free Movement of Capital and the EMU (n 6) 62; Usher, The Law of Money and 
Financial Services in European Community (n 5) 171
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The  system,  although  some  economists  are  more  indulgent,158 proved 
ineffective and several realignments occurred during the first years.
As already pointed out previously, the 1980s saw many changes and a 
more  positive  attitude  towards  free  market  (likely  influenced  by 
conservative governments such as that headed by Margaret Thatcher in 
the United Kingdom). The liberalization of capital,  in 1988, led to the 
reopening of the EMU discussion and finally to the Delors Report, in 
1989,  which  provided  various  suggestions  as  to  how monetary  union 
would have to be.
Moreover, the CJEU acknowledged in its Opinion 1/91 (dealing with a 
possible agreement with EFTA) that the introduction of EMU was a goal 
set out in the existing Treaties.159 The scholars agree that EMU helps the 
Union attain the objectives listed under art. 2 TEU.160
The scope of this study does not leave too much room for explaining all 
the different stages by which EMU has been implemented. From a legal 
point of view, monetary union has been achieved through a mix of “soft-
law”,  especially during the first  years after  the sign of the Maastricht 
Treaty,161 and “hard-law”, with the incorporation instead of binding rules 
in  the  Treaties  (with the exception of  the  Member  States  which have 
chosen to remain outside, subject to a different system). The core of the 
monetary policy lies in the current art.  119(2) TFEU (former art.  4(2) 
TEC), where the objectives are expressly listed, such as the establishment 
of  a  single  monetary  policy  aimed  primarily  at  maintaining  price 
stability.162
To  narrow  the  topic  on  the  issues  relevant  for  the  purposes  of  this 
dissertation, one of the outstanding aspect is the legal framework behind 
the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European System of Central 
Bank (ESCB),  which  is  of  paramount  importance  also  in  light  of  the 
158 Molle (n 17) 272
159 Usher 'Legal Background of the Euro' (n 153) 8
160 Hindelang (n 4) 19-20
161 Francis Snyder, 'EMU – Integration and Differentiation: Metaphor for European Union' in Paul Craig and Gràinne de Bùrca  
(eds), The Evolution of EU Law (2nd edition, Oxford University Press, 2011) 693-696
162 Usher, 'The Evolution of the Economic and Monetary Union' (n 134) 308
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possible evolution towards a banking union (see Chapter 5).
3.5.1 The ECB and the ESCB
The shift to EMU has staggered one of the most long-standing principles, 
which sees the monetary competence as a sign of state power.
Nowadays, for at least 17 countries of EU, the central bank in charge of 
monetary policy is the ECB. The status of this organ is peculiar:163 it has 
legal personality but it was not deemed an European Institution until the 
adoption of the Lisbon Treaty,164 where it is currently listed under art. 13 
TEU alongside the others; it is entitled to an action for the annulment of 
an act (art. 263(3) TFEU) when its prerogatives are affected. On the other 
hand,  its  acts  or  omissions  are  subject  to  judicial  review (art.  263(1) 
TFEU).165
The provisions relative to the institutional status of the ECB are the art. 
282 to 284 of TFEU. It can be noted how this authority has been modeled 
on the german Bundesbank, characterized by strong independence and 
accountability.
The  main  task  of  ECB  is  the  price  stability  and  the  conduct  of  the 
monetary policy, therefore the control of inflation, as provided for by art. 
127 to 133 TFEU, whereas other tasks such as the support of the policies 
pursued by the EU are deemed secondary.166
As of  today,  the  ECB is  part  of  the  ESCB,  comprising  all  the  other 
Central Banks (including those of states not part of EMU) which are to 
be independent as well.  The oversight is  responsibility of the national 
Central Banks, an issue which has lately been called into question and 
could be radically changed once launched the banking union (see Chapter 
163 Jakob de Haan and Laurence Gormley, 'Independence and Accountability of the European Central Bank', in Mats Andenas, 
Laurence Gormley, Christos Hadjiemmanuil, Ian Harden (eds), European Economic and Monetary Union: the Institutional Framework 
(Kluwer Law International, 1997) 338-344; Usher, The Law of Money and Financial Services in European Community (n 5) 216-223
164 Snyder (n 161) 702: the authors signals how the ECB raised objections on the ground that this “new” status could affect its  
independence.
165 Usher, The Law of Money and Financial Services in European Community (n 5) 229
166 de Haan, Gormley (n 163) 342
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4 and 5).
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4 Banking and its relationship with the free movement of 
capital.  The  need  to  create  an  integrated  market  in 
financial services.
4.1 Capital and banking: how liberalization has bolstered the 
market of financial services and created potential dangers at 
the same time
To create a fully functional internal market, as stated since the beginning 
of the present dissertation, different elements are to be considered. On 
such  an  assumption,  the  four  freedoms  of  the  Treaties  have  been 
conceived:  although  they  are  distinct  concepts,  the  goal  of  a  true 
integrated area can be attained only if all the elements enjoy the same 
degree of liberalization. 
In the section 1.5 of Chapter 1 it has been illustrated, even though while 
limiting  the  research  on  free  movement  of  capital,  how the  different 
freedoms are a natural complement of the others and the curtailment of 
one may have a serious impact on the internal market as a whole.
After having outlined the main features of the free movement of capital, 
along with its paramount importance, it is time to adopt a broader view 
capable of not just considering it as such but rather pointing out its role in 
what  has  been  defined  the  “financial  single  market”.167 A particular 
regard, in this context, will be given to the most relevant actor, namely 
the banking sector.
The  historical  background  is  worth  being  remembered  once  again. 
During the 80s, with a radical shift towards a market-based approach, the 
Member  States  decided  to  leap  forward  after  the  stagnation  of  the 
previous decade and started an ambitious program aimed at completing 
167 Mikita Malgorzata: 'EU Single Financial Market: Prospects of Changes' (2012), Financial Internet Quarterly, Vol. 8, Issue 1,  
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/66762  54-55
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the internal market. One of the most noteworthy aspect was the choice to 
liberalize the capital movements, along with the launch of the EMU.
In  this  scenario,  the  underlying  idea  was  to  create  and  strengthen  a 
market of financial services (mainly banks and insurances) which would 
have fostered the economic growth by facilitating the transactions and 
reducing their  costs,  as  well  as  favoring  an  optimal  allocation  of  the 
resources.
The financial market consists of services which are often connected to 
capital  movements;  the  banks  are  the  undisputed  protagonists  in  this 
field. At the same time it regards the freedom of establishment:168 once 
services  and  capital  movements  are  free  from  constraints,  the 
opportunities  increase  considerably  and  the  providers  might  want  to 
expand  business  by  setting  up  branches  or  subsidiaries  in  another 
Member States with the intention to conquer new markets. Although it 
has been observed how the majority of banks exclusively work with the 
domestic market, a free market area permits the creation of cross-border 
conglomerates and a diversification of the activities pursued.169
Three  are  the  pillars  of  single  financial  market,  namely the  complete 
liberalization of capital, services and the freedom of establishment.170 If, 
moreover, the EMU project removes the uncertainties related to exchange 
rates,  hence possible  additional  costs,  the  incentives  to  expand across 
borders are even more evident.171
In order to attain such goals, besides what has been listed here, the Union 
(and  before  it  the  Community)  has  repeatedly  intervened  with  its 
legislation with the aim to regulate the banking activities.
It would go beyond the scope of this study to carefully analyze the legal 
framework regulating banking, but some rules are to be borne in mind for 
a clear understanding.
168 Mohamed, European Community Law on the Free Movement of Capital and the EMU (n 6) 181-182
169 Martin Cihák,  Jörg Decressin,  'The  Case  for  a  European  Banking Charter'  (July 2007),  IMF Working  Paper  No.  07/153,  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1007922  5: the authors underscore that the current situation is probably the result of 
the fragmentation of the European legal framework in banking.
170 Mohamed, European Financial Services Law (n 126) 201
171 Ibid 211
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During the first years many attempts to harmonize the field were bound 
to  fail:  the  art.  61(2)  EEC  (now  art.  58(2)  TFEU),  by  requiring  to 
liberalize the banking services in  parallel  with capital,  along with art. 
57(2)  EEC,  which  prescribed  an  unanimous  vote  to  adopt  secondary 
legislation  whose  aim was  to  harmonize  the  field,  make  it  extremely 
difficult to create a common legal framework.172 The capital movements 
were not free at all, while the latter requirement was exposed to vetoes. 
The latter provision was amended only with the adoption of the Single 
European  Act,  entered  into  force  in  1987,  introducing  the  qualified 
majority to replace the unanimity required until then.173
Directives have however been enacted throughout the years, the first one 
in 1977 known as First Banking Directive174 and whose importance is 
deemed minimal (besides the existence of capital controls, the directive 
aimed at achieving a complete harmonization, which proved politically 
impossible),175 then  the  more  relevant  Second  Banking  Directive,176 
entered into force in 1993, now repealed and replaced by the Directive 
2006/48/EC.177
While  referring  to  the  next  section  as  regards  the  examination  of  the 
aforementioned legislation, few other things are to be added.
The main point to notice is that the idea of financial services market is 
based on a series of connections and links. It is not a case that a provision 
such as art.  58(2) TFEU (former art.  61(2) EEC and 51(2) TEC) was 
drafted  and  never  repealed:178 to  offer  services  without  restrictions 
presupposes  the  free  movement  of  capital;179 such  a  liberalization 
requires  to  take  appropriate  monetary  measures  in  absence  of  which 
172 Mohamed, European Community Law on the Free Movement of Capital and the EMU (n 6) 188
173 Andenas, Hadjiemmanuil (n 145) 381
174 First Council Directive 77/780/EEC on the co-ordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the 
taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions [1977] OJ L322/30
175 Mohamed, European Community Law on the Free Movement of Capital and the EMU (n 6) 189-190
176 Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC of 15 December 1989 on the co-ordination of laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions and amending Directive 77/780/EEC [1989] OJ L386
177 European Parliament and Council Directive 2006/48/EC of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of 
credit institutions (recast) [2006] OJ L177
178 Mohamed, European Community Law on the Free Movement of Capital and the EMU (n 6) 184
179 Ibid 183
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serious disturbances could occur and lead to the demise of the project 
itself; a monetary union is a viable way to address such problems180 but 
its  implementation  also  requires  several  adjustments,  including  in  the 
banking area.  Economists  have pointed  out  other  elements,  which  are 
object  of  debate  nowadays,  such as  the  need to  converge  towards  an 
economic union if not a real political federation. These last aspects will 
not be addressed here, but it is fundamental to be aware of them.
Although  scholars  have  often  identified  problems  and  possible 
shortcomings, most choices have become unavoidable following practical 
experience. The liberalization of capital, in its various stages, caused as 
expected currency upheavals with detrimental effects on the economy, 
unveiling the potential  risks alongside its  undeniable advantages.  That 
pushed in favor of the monetary union, being clear that tensions in the 
exchange rates could have been lethal to many economies within the EU.
After 2008 and during the recent financial crisis the EMU has been under 
serious  strain,  and  even  a  possible  break-up  was  figured,  due  to  the 
distress  of  the  banking  sector  which  had  excessively  grown after  the 
liberalization and prone to moral hazard.
All this premise is necessary to understand that free movement of capital 
(and services), the monetary dimension, the banking field and the legal 
framework behind all of them are not to be seen from a static point of 
view,  but  rather  as  different  parts  of  a  dynamic  process,  whose 
connections are sometimes hard to unravel.181
The proposal of a banking union, whose details and most important legal 
and economic issues will be explained in Chapter 5, is one of the first 
steps suggested to remedy possible existing defects and favor instead a 
new start for financial services market.
180 Andenas, Hadjiemmanuil (n 145) 375
181 Usher, The Law of Money and Financial Services in European Community (n 5) 20
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4.2 Current relevant legal framework and harmonization: the 
Banking Directives and the “european single passport”
The legal sources to take into account for the purposes of this study are 
the Banking Directives, as mentioned in the previous section. 
The  Second  Banking  Directive  was  enacted  in  1989.  It  can  be 
immediately  noticed  that  its  introduction  is  contemporary  to  the 
liberalization of capital and the launch of EMU.182 The principles therein 
included have been maintained in the successive Directive 2006/48/EC, 
currently into force with no significant changes.
Unlike  in  the  past,  the  Member  States  have  opted  for  a  minimum 
harmonization, which means that a comprehensive set of rules regulating 
the  banking  field  has  not  been  drawn up.183 The  reason  for  avoiding 
drafting a common rulebook is mainly political:184 the Union is made up 
of countries with traditions and practices which differ greatly, therefore it 
was thought more suitable to establish a minimum standard and leave the 
single Member States the possibility to continue adopting their own rules, 
which might often be stricter.
The  most  important  of  the  common  provisions,  along  with  the 
requirement of minimum capital endowment, is the institution of the so-
called “single passport” or “home-state control”. The Directive provides 
also a narrow definition of credit institution as 'an undertaking whose 
business is to receive deposits or other repayable funds from the public  
and grants credit for its own account'.185 
A  premise  will  clarify  the  terms  of  the  issue.  Banking  activity  is 
surrounded by safeguards and prudential rules to comply with in each 
country. To set up a credit institute such rules are to be followed, but that 
182 Mohamed, European Community Law on the Free Movement of Capital and the EMU (n 6) 190-191
183 Such a choice has been criticized on the ground that it does not lead to a real unified market, see Andenas, Hadjiemmanuil (n 
145) 383-384
184 Ibid 382
185 Mohamed, European Community Law on the Free Movement of Capital and the EMU (n 6) 193: the author argues that such a 
narrow definition is not compatible with the broader meaning conferred to freedom to provide services in the Treaties, then it is likely to  
restrict the free flow of capital.
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might be cumbersome and resource consuming for all banks which intend 
to expand their activities outside the country where they have the seat. 
Moreover, banks are subject to oversight by an independent body, often 
the Central Bank of the state (in some countries, such as Germany and 
Belgium, the supervision tasks are conferred to a separate institution, in 
order not to impinge the independence of the organ entrusted to carry out 
the monetary policy; other implications will be analyzed further and are 
one of the most debated questions related to banking union).
Given the absence of  rules  at  Union level  and the different  standards 
between Member States, a single financial market would be hampered 
and banks might prefer to remain within their jurisdiction. However, by 
doing so the benefits granted by the liberalization of capital and services, 
as well as establishment, would be seriously curtailed.186
The Banking Directives provide a solution to this issue, by allowing a 
credit  institute  authorized  in  a  Member  State  to  provide  the  same 
services, for which it is authorized in the home-state, in another one by 
means  of  branches.  The  prudential  rules  and  the  supervision  are 
responsibility of the home-state.
It is thus said that once a bank obtains the authorization in one of the 
Members, it gets a “passport” for the whole EU. The rules at issue, as 
mentioned, concern only the establishment of a branch without separate 
legal  personality,  whereas  setting  up  a  subsidiary  requires  the  same 
compliance which would be necessary to start a new bank in that state. 
While a branch calls upon the home bank's deposit fund, a subsidiary is 
comparable  to  an  independent  institution,187 with  its  own  assets; 
supervision and assistance to depositors are provided by the host state.
In order to avoid a race to the bottom or lax requirements, the Directives 
set out minimum standards to be respected, such as the minimum capital 
to be held.188
186 Bakker (n 8) 209
187 Philip Booth, Alan Morrison, 'Promoting a Free Market by Ending the Single Market – Reforming EU Financial Regulation',  
Economic Affairs, 32 24
188 Andenas, Hadjiemmanuil (n 145) 384
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The  limitation  to  branches  has  been  criticized  on  the  basis  that 
asymmetries might occur, thereby leading to a possible fragmentation of 
the market189 (see infra Chapter 5). Not only, because the idea itself of 
“single passport” has been under scrutiny:190 according to some scholars, 
to  maintain  different  prudential  regimes  throughout  the  Union  may 
constitute a serious hindrance capable of frustrating the free market of 
banking services.
4.3  Oversight  of  banks  and  role  of  national  supervisors. 
Critical points in the current situation: the risk of fragmentation 
of the market
Even after the launch of EMU, and the subsequent establishment of ECB 
and  ESCB,  the  supervision  of  banks  has  remained  national.  For  the 
countries members of the Eurozone (17 as of now) the ECB is the only 
competent body as regards the monetary policy, while the single Central 
Banks or other entrusted bodies are responsible for monitoring all banks 
and  subsidiaries  present  in  their  national  territory,  together  with  the 
branches taken up in other member states pursuant to the principle of 
“home control”.
A series  of  fundamental  tasks,  such  as  the  authorization  to  carry out 
banking  activities  or  acting  as  lender-of-last-resort,  remain  therefore 
incumbent  upon each single  state.191 The ECB is  not  a  lender-of-last-
resort,192 mainly  due to  the  strong  opposition  of  Germany during  the 
discussions  which  would  lead  to  the  EMU:  it  was  assumed  that,  by 
conferring such a role to ECB, moral hazard would have been inevitable 
and could have caused a constant threat to the stability of the Eurozone.
189 Mohamed, European Community Law on the Free Movement of Capital and the EMU (n 6) 193
190 Booth,Morrison (n 187) 25
191 It must be borne in mind, however, that prudential supervision and lender-of-last-resort intervention, although sharing the aim of 
maintaining stability, are to be kept distinct: while the latter is carried out ex post, as a remedy in case of systemic risks, supervision is by 
nature ex ante, in order to ensure the stability of the banking system..
192 Andenas, Hadjiemmanuil (n 145) 406
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The current state of affairs, as demonstrated during the recent crisis, is 
not satisfactory and risks to undermine the single market and to favor a 
misplacement of the resources which runs counter the liberalization of 
capital movements.193 At the same doubts on the EMU sustainability have 
sharply arisen. 
The main problem regards the supervision and the role played by Central 
Banks (or the other bodies in charge of it).
In a monetary union the volume of transactions tends to increase due to 
the reduction of transaction costs and the fact that capital can move freely 
(basic  assumption  underpinning  it).  At  the  same  time,  the  national 
regulators  view  the  interest  of  the  single  country  as  paramount, 
notwithstanding  the  area  to  take  into  account  should  be  the  EU as  a 
whole (including those states who have not joined EMU).
The interest of a single state is likely to conflict with the need to preserve 
the integrity of a single market, especially in time of crisis. The free flow 
of capital, a single currency and the possibility to take up branches within 
the  Union  without  complying  with  additional  rules  are  a  powerful 
incentive towards the growth of the financial sector; by contrast, the risks 
to  be assessed remain on a national  plan.  This asymmetry may cause 
problematic imbalances.194
Despite  their  independence,  the  supervisors  might  be  prone to  accept 
greater risks taken by national banks during positive cycles, while during 
crises the state of mind could be the opposite: a single state is much less 
inclined  to  assume  the  burden  for  operation  carried  out  by  branches 
abroad or subsidiaries of foreign banks within the state itself. It must be 
borne  in  mind,  furthermore,  that  even  though  a  deposit  protection  is 
required (in 2010 the threshold has been raised to cover deposits up to € 
100.000195), such a guarantee is to be provided by the single state which 
193 Booth, Morrison (n 187) 25: the authors quote Mervyn King, Governor of Bank of England, who says that banks are 'global in  
life but local in death'.
194 Thorsten Beck, 'Why the Rush? Short-term Crisis Resolution and Long-term Bank Stability', in Thorsten Beck (ed),  Banking 
Union for Europe: Risks and Challenges  (Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2012) 39: the authors refers to the famous “tragedy of 
the commons”, where everyone would like to rely on the others in sharing the burden.
195 Gerard Hertig, Ruben Lee, Joseph A. McCahery, 'Empowering the ECB to Supervise Banks: A Choice-Based Approach' 
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is the only responsible, in absence of a common protection at EU level. 
Although some authors  have suggested that  the obligation to  afford a 
protection may act as a disincentive for the Member States to adopt lax 
policies,196 the reality seems to have proven the opposite: such a situation 
strengthens the link between public finances and the banking system on 
one hand and on the other, with the supervisors more keen to protect their 
own  country,  it  may  exacerbate  the  fragmentation.  The  existing 
architecture does not seem to be compatible with an open market.197
The  depositors  are  less  informed  by  investors,  then  a  situation  of 
uncertainty is likely to cause either a “bank run” or at least a drain of 
resources. If the protection of depositors is linked to the public finances, 
the  state  itself  could  have  difficulty  in  ensuring  it,  thereby  creating 
another  vicious  circle  where  the  banks  may  go  bankrupt  and  create 
additional  burden  for  the  country  (whose  sovereign  bonds  are, 
furthermore, often held by the banks).
When  a  bank  crisis  occurs,  the  regulator  of  that  state  will  suggest, 
although informally,  to repatriate resources held by the subsidiaries in 
another member country, while the latter will have interest to keep them; 
accordingly, the latter will discourage the banks subject to its control (for 
instance, the subsidiaries) to transfer funds to the parent bank, so called 
“ring-fencing”,198 or  to  lend  money  or  invest  where  the  crisis  is 
ongoing.199 These tactics, often based on moral suasion, have the effect to 
stop the capital flows between Member States, thereby aggravating the 
troubles.200 Savings generated in a Member State do not move towards 
other  areas  of  the  internal  market;  following  that,  the  banks  in  one 
Member country might need the intervention of the State; if the public 
(August 2009), ECGI Working Paper Series in Finance, Working Paper N°. 262/2009, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1327824  7
196 Andenas, Hadjiemmanuil (n 145) 385
197 Various Authors, A Banking Union for the Euro Area (IMF Staff Discussion Note, February 2013) 7
198 Cihák, Decressin (n 169) 9-10: the authors point out that, so long as the supervisors are accountable to the national legislator,  
they will be inclined to maximize the assets of the national banks while trying at the same time to minimize the costs, which would likely  
fall on taxpayers.
199 Daniel Gros, 'The Single European Market in Banking in Decline – ECB to the Rescue?', in Thorsten Beck (ed), Banking Union 
for Europe: Risks and Challenges  (Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2012) 53
200 Ibid 51: the author uses the word “balkanize”.
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finances  are  not  sound,  or  if  the  amount  of  liquidity  necessary  is 
considerable (the Ireland crisis is an outright example), the burden of the 
sovereign debt becomes hard to bear.
The final outcome is represented by a complete market fragmentation, 
with  the  single  Member  States  progressively  isolated  in  the  financial 
market.201 That  frustrates  the  aim  pursued  by  the  Treaties  and  poses 
serious threats to EMU,202 whose eventual collapse would likely entail 
the end of the free movement of capital as the first effect, despite the 
imperative provisions laid down in the Treaties.
Why there is an incentive to act in such a way? The answer is articulate. 
Firstly,  the  single  regulators  are  not  well  informed  as  to  the  credit 
institutions  established  in  other  jurisdictions203 (even  though 
collaboration  is  required  in  a  monetary  union,  the  regulators  might 
conceal important information in order to prevent panic from spreading); 
secondly, in case of necessary intervention, the state is not interested in 
assisting banks, and therefore depositors, not subject to its own control. 
National supervisors thus act to protect the home stability, instead than 
that  of  the  Eurozone  as  a  whole.204 Political  reasons  might  be  put 
forward,205 first and foremost the necessity to protect taxpayers' money.
All these hypothetical scenarios, already foreseen at the inception of the 
EMU, have proven real  in  the last  years  and suggested  the European 
Institutions to take appropriate measures. It is absolutely remarkable to 
notice, as said, the dynamic integration of aspects apparently distinct and 
separate,  what  the  art.  58(2)  TFEU seemed to  beckon since  the  very 
beginning.
The monetary integration has been a powerful tool for the growth of the 
financial sector, but such an expansion has created systemic risks where 
201 Pedro Gustavo Teixeira, 'The Regulation of the European Financial Market After the Crisis',  in  Pompeo Della Posta, Leila 
Simona Talani (eds), Europe and the Financial Crisis (Palgrave McMillan, 2011) 10-12
202 Jean Pisani-Ferry, André Sapir, Nicolas Véron, Guntram B. Wolff, 'What Kind of European Banking Union' June 2012, Bruegel  
Policy Contribution, Issue 2012/12 3
203 Cihák, Decressin (n 169) 7
204 Gros (n 199) 52
205 Cihák, Decressin (n 169) 9
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banks involved in cross-border activities might also become “too big to 
fail”, causing further uncertainty (for instance, which state is supposed to 
intervene  in  case  of  troubles)  which  can  be  extremely  harmful  for  a 
functioning market.206 
4.4 The necessity of a supervision at European level in light of 
the recent crisis
Besides the liberalization of capital movements, the Delors Report and 
other scholars pointed out that a sustainable monetary union required also 
a stable banking system.207
In order to attain such a goal, which is fundamental to reach an integrated 
market in the financial services, the proposal to shift the oversight of the 
credit institutions from the national to the European level is not a new 
idea.
Already  during  the  first  years  of  EMU,  before  the  financial  crisis 
staggered  many  certainties,  the  discussion  as  to  how  to  avoid  the 
fragmentation of the market was an argument of debate,208 since it was 
questionable whether to leave the supervision at the national level could 
be sustainable in a monetary union. However, any project clashed most of 
the times against the lack of political will, the same which prevented for 
many years the completion of internal market from becoming reality.
Many contributions  have  been  written,209 also  with  comparisons  with 
other  legal  systems  (the  United  States  above  all210).  Some  common 
206 Booth, Morrison (n 187) 25
207 Hindelang (n 4) 19; Gamble (n 137) 326
208 Hertig, Lee, McCahery (n 195) 2; Wim Fonteyne, 'EU: From Monetary to Financial Union', Finance and Development, vol. 43, 
no. 2, June 2006 5; Andenas, Hadjiemmanuil (n 145) 386
209 Dirk Schoenmaker, 'Banking Supervision and Lender-of-last-resort in EMU', in Mats Andenas, Laurence Gormley, Christos  
Hadjiemmanuil, Ian Harden (eds),  European Economic and Monetary Union: the Institutional Framework  (Kluwer Law International, 
1997) 436; Jean Pisani-Ferry, 'The Euro Crisis and the New Impossible Trinity' January 2012, Bruegel Policy Contribution, Issue 2012/01 
10 quoting Eichengreen and Wyplosz, who suggested than banking supervision would have been a more effective policy than the fiscal  
constraints.
210 Larry D. Wall,  María J.  Nieto,  David Mayes,  'Creating an EU-Level Supervisor  for Cross-Border Banking Groups: Issues 
Raised by the U.S. Experience with Dual Banking' (March 2011), Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Working Paper 2011-06
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features can be observed and have become part of the official proposal 
issued by the Commission. 
Some effects of the absence of common supervision may be observed in 
practice.  Activities  such  as  those  described,  either  “ring-fencing”  or 
induced restrictions (and not caught by the rules on capital) cause a drop 
in  the  interbank  lending,  as  well  as  a  halt  in  the  investments  (with 
remarkable consequences on the intra-Union balance of payment211).
A single supervisor instead would not be penalizing cross-border lending 
as the national ones do nowadays.212
211 Jean Pisani-Ferry, André Sapir, Nicolas Véron and Guntram B. Wolff, 'What Kind of European Banking Union', Bruegel Policy 
Contribution, Issue 2012/12, June 2012 3
212 Gros (n 199) 54
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5 The proposed banking union and its possible impact in 
the field of capital movements
5.1 Why a banking union?
One of the strategies devised to tackle the problems here analyzed and 
capable of restoring the confidence in the EMU first, but consequently in 
the  EU  as  an  internal  market,  is  represented  by  the  Proposal  for  a 
Banking Union.213 According to the Commission itself, the launch of the 
project should be already in July 2013, but most likely such a deadline 
will be postponed (to 2014 or later).
The banking union is the first step towards a further integration of the 
financial market. Other fundamental aspects will be the introduction of a 
common protection  for  depositors  along with a  system of  bank crisis 
management.214
By  reading  the  comment  enclosed  to  the  official  documents,  its 
implementation  should  be  possible  on  the  basis  of  the  current  legal 
framework, without requiring modifications of the Treaties.215
The idea has sparked off a lively debate and has met oppositions; at the 
same time it gives rise to legal issues which are the object of the section 
5.3 and are seriously to be taken into account.
It has been observed that as of today there does not exist an identical 
level  playing  field.216 National  interests  still  collide  with  the  need  to 
achieve  a  common  market  in  the  financial  services,  which  is  a 
213 Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating 
to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, Brussels, 12.9.2012 COM(2012) 511 final
214 The common opinion among commentators is that the single supervisory alone can do little if the other steps are not put into 
practice, see Various Authors (n 197) 12 
215 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 'A Roadmap Towards a Banking Union',  
12.9.2012 COM(2012) 510 final
216 Vasso Ioannidou,  'A First  Step Towards a  Banking Union',  in  Thorsten Beck (ed),  Banking Union for Europe:  Risks  and  
Challenges  (Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2012) 88-89: the banking union could provide a level playing fields by removing the  
perverse incentives for the national regulators to side with its own bank, thereby leading to market fragmentation; Cihák, Decressin (n 
169) 8
74
fundamental requirement for a working market of goods and persons. 
In Commission's words, instead, the single market and the banking union 
are mutually reinforcing.217
5.2 Commission's proposal in detail
The Commission delivered the proposal on a banking union in September 
2012 to be submitted to the Council, where an agreement were found in 
December of the same year.218
As anticipated, it is assumed that the current framework provides for the 
legal basis for its adoption without being necessary Treaties amendments, 
which require as known unanimity and therefore are highly subject to the 
risk of vetoes. 
The solution suggested lies in the art. 127(6) TFEU, enabling the Council 
acting  unanimously to  confer  to  ECB further  competences  when it  is 
deemed  necessary  ('specific  tasks  upon  the  European  Central  Bank  
concerning  policies  relating  to  the  prudential  supervision  of  credit  
institutions  and  other  financial  institutions  with  the  exception  of  
insurance undertakings'). 
Pursuant  to  this  provision,  the  Commission  identifies  the  tasks  to  be 
transferred to ECB from the national regulators, either Central Banks or 
other  bodies  in  charge  of  banking  oversight,  among  which  the 
authorization  to  set  up a  credit  institution,  to  ensure  compliance  with 
safety  and  soundness  and,  in  extreme  cases,  to  shut  down  a  credit 
institution.219
Although the aforementioned provision is framed in a broad way, there 
are doubts as to whether it is really possible to entrust the ECB with such 
217 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 'A Roadmap Towards a Banking Union',  
12.9.2012 COM(2012) 510 final 4
218 Various Authors (n 197) 13
219 Ioannidou (n 216) 88; Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 'A Roadmap Towards 
a Banking Union', 12.9.2012 COM(2012) 510 final 7
75
extensive powers: the rule at issue permits that “specific”, then limited 
tasks,  can  be  transferred,  but  probably  on  the  assumption  that  the 
prudential supervision remains within the national authorities. It cannot 
be excluded at the outset that actions for annulment on the grounds of the 
lack of competence may be brought to the CJEU220 (the ECB in fact may 
enact regulations having binding nature, art. 132 TFEU, therefore subject 
to judicial review, as laid down in art. 263 TFEU). 
Given  the  importance  of  independence  and  accountability  incumbent 
upon  ECB,  several  safeguards  are  provided  as  well  as  checks  and 
balances, such as the reinforced role of the Parliament in the process (the 
entire Chapter IV of the proposed Regulation deals with the matter).
Another  remarkable  thing  to  underscore  is  that  the  Commission  has 
chosen to include all the banks of the Eurozone, regardless of their size or 
the type of activities they carry out, pointing out how the financial market 
is  to  be  seen  as  one  and  that  even  small-size  or  local  banks  might 
undermine stability. With regard to states outside the EMU, the Proposal 
does not affect their position but leave the possibility to opt-in, and then 
join  the  banking  union,  while  continuing  to  retain  an  independent 
monetary policy (other solutions were viewed as politically unviable, see 
section 5.3.3 for further details). The idea at the ground is that a common 
regulator is a stronger guarantee for the whole EU.
5.3 Criticisms on the proposal
5.3.1 The issue of subsidiarity
From a  legal  point  of  view,  the  first  problem to  address  regards  the 
compatibility of the proposal, which aims at conferring greater powers to 
ECB by transferring it from the national regulators, with the principle of 
220 Various Authors (n 197) 24
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subsidiarity.
Such a principle is one of the cornerstones of the EU and it is enshrined 
in the TEU (art. 5(3)). According to it, the Union and its Institutions can 
be conferred a power only when the same objective cannot be attained at 
the local level or it is preferable that the issue is addressed at the Union 
level. Prudential supervision is an area where the competence of the EU 
is  shared  with  the  Member  States  and  therefore  subject  to  such  a 
principle.221
The current situation, in fact, seems to reflect perfectly the principle, with 
the division of competences between ECB and national regulators. The 
assumption is that the national authorities are more well equipped, since 
they have developed expertise and know better the local scenario than the 
ECB. At the same time, this division of powers is one of the causes of the 
distortions  that  are  likely  to  happen  and  which  seriously  impair  the 
functioning of the internal market, by fragmenting it.
The objection cannot be disregarded. The CJEU has ruled several times 
that the violation of the general principles of EU law is ground for an 
action of annulment. 
Therefore, the Regulation by means of which the ECB is empowered to 
perform tasks previously responsibility of the Member States might be, in 
theory, exposed to such an action, brought by one of the Member States.
A judicial  review grounded  on  the  subsidiarity  principle  is,  however, 
conceivable  but  its  concrete  application  has  never  been  defined  with 
precision.  To  prove  the  infringement  appears  highly  unlikely.222 Even 
those who foresaw a possible emergence of the problem eventually came 
to the conclusion that the necessity to have an unanimous vote renders 
the question more academic than real.223 Moreover, it would be quite odd 
that a State first votes in favor of the conferral of new powers to ECB 
(and  in  this  case  there  cannot  be  dissenting  votes)  and  later  on  it 
221 Andenas, Hadjiemmanuil (n 145) 408-411
222 Paul Craig, Grainne de Burca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Material (5th edition, Oxford University Press) 98-99: approximately 20 
cases have been decided by the CJEU, while the Regulations issued by EU throughout the years have been thousands.
223 Andenas, Hadjiemmanuil (n 145) 410
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challenges the same regulation:224 the action could be easily dismissed, 
given that any remark might have been raised in the previous stage.
In any case, it is also true that the implementation of a banking union 
does not deprive the national bodies of all  the powers related to bank 
oversight,  then they would still  play a relevant role albeit  diminished. 
The  amended  framework  would  maintain  a  role  for  the  national 
authorities, also because it is acknowledged how the latter may work in a 
more  efficient  way  with  regards  to  the  collection  of  data  and  other 
fundamental information.
5.3.2 New role of the ECB
Another possible objection regards the position of ECB once empowered 
to perform the new tasks.225
It might be asserted that the combination of powers concerning monetary 
policy on one hand and monitoring and oversight, on the other, creates 
conflicts of interest within the ECB itself, thereby rendering it unfit to 
carry out them appropriately.
In order to avoid such a conflict, it has been suggested to create a new 
body, separate from ECB and responsible for the oversight. The solution 
would have the merit  to dispel  doubts as  to  any possible  interference 
capable  of  affecting  the  independent  position  of  the  ECB  and  the 
effectiveness  of  the  monetary  policy,  but  it  seems  quite  obvious  that 
finding a  legal  basis  other  than  the aforementioned art.  127(6)  TFEU 
could be an arduous task. It is not impossible, but probably it requires 
that the Treaties be amended, with all that it means in practice.226
An intermediate  suggestion  is  the  separation,  within  the  ECB,  of  the 
functions in order to avert conflicts.
224 Craig, de Burca (n 222) 98
225 Jean Pisani-Ferry (n 202) 11
226 Sideek Mohamed, 'A Legal Analysis of the Global Financial Crisis from an EU Perspective' (September 2009), SIEPS European 
Policy Analysis, issue 10 5
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However, the opinions on the topic are various.227 Others believe instead 
that the ECB is the best solution,228 given also its status of independence 
from all governments. Moreover, already now the ECB cooperates with 
the national authorities, therefore the staff would be prepared to perform 
the  new  tasks  without  further  complications.  The  possible  conflict 
between  monetary  policy  and  financial  stability  would  seem  more 
apparent than real.229
5.3.3 Eurozone countries  and Member  States  outside:  what  treatment? 
Possible suggestions
The debate has also touched the treatment to reserve to those countries 
which  are  part  of  EU but  outside  EMU,  by virtue  of  special  opt-out 
protocols (United Kingdom and Denmark) or for other reasons (the most 
common not meeting the convergence criteria regarding inflation target 
or sovereign debt). Should they be part of the banking union?
Some premises will clarify the issue: although the EMU was launched 
with the aim to facilitate the market integration, especially in the field of 
capital movements which has a strong bearing on monetary sovereignty 
and whose freedom may exert strong pressure over the exchange rate, 
some Member States decided not to join, while others were not deemed 
eligible  (for  economic  reasons)  or  have  postponed  their  entry. 
Notwithstanding  that,  the  rules  of  the  Treaty  with  regards  to  free 
movement of capital apply to all the 27 (soon 28) Member countries.
The  Proposal  for  a  banking  union  is  addressed  to  the  states  within 
Eurozone,  since  the  stability  of  the  banking  sector  is  of  utmost 
importance for a stable single currency. In order to remove the vicious 
incentives that lead to fragmentation and, consequently, to disruptions to 
the  functioning  of  the  EMU,  these  states  are  necessarily  part  of  the 
227 A thorough analysis of benefits and disadvantages can be found in  Andenas, Hadjiemmanuil (n 145) 386-394
228 Ioannidou (n 216) 90; Hertig, Lee, McCahery (n 195)
229 Andenas, Hadjiemmanuil (n 145) 415-416; Ioannidou (n 216) 93
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project. It would be also quite logical to establish the ECB not just as the 
main actor  in  the conduct  of the monetary policy but  as the supreme 
guarantee over the banking stability.
Although  among  the  economists  doubts  have  been  raised  as  to  the 
effectiveness of a banking union not comprising all the Member States,230 
the Commission has preferred to leave the “outs” to choose whether or 
not to confer the powers to ECB by joining the banking union.
5.3.4 Other problems (in brief): single protection of depositors
To solve the numerous problems which affect EU at the moment might 
appear a daunting task. The banking union is a possibility and only time 
will tell whether it has been a wise choice or not.
The  Commission  and  the  other  EU  institutions,  however,  along  with 
commentators and financial experts  agree upon that its  introduction is 
only the first necessary move towards stabilization and other initiatives 
are to follow suit, otherwise the Banking Union's alleged benefits would 
be rendered pointless.231
One of the most sensitive points is the introduction of a common safety 
net for the protection of the depositors, a means intended to rule out any 
risk of “bank run” and to break the connections between banks and public 
finances:  situations  that  might  instead  call  for  the  reintroduction  of 
capital controls, openly conflicting with art. 63 TFEU.  
The issues to be addressed are mainly economic and would fall outside 
the scope of this work.  What is important to bear in mind is  that the 
banking  union,  although  it  can  be  a  tool  towards  a  further  financial 
integration, cannot be alone the “final solution” but just an unavoidable 
first step.232
230 Pisani-Ferry, Sapir, Véron, Wolff (n 202) 7: a banking union embracing all the EU states would be the best solution, but it is  
seen as politically difficult.
231 Report by President of the European Council  Herman Van Rompuy,  'Towards a  genuine Economic and Monetary Union',  
26.6.2012, EUCO 120/12  4
232 Luca  Marcolin,  'L’Unione bancaria  avvicina  l’Europa  al  redde  rationem [Banking  Union  is  leading to  redde  rationem in 
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5.4 Does banking union strengthen the EMU? Towards a more 
unified single financial market
At the time this dissertation was being written, it was still uncertain the 
destiny of the Proposal delivered by the Commission and preliminarily 
approved by the Council.  There  were  many doubts  as  to  whether  the 
Regulation would enter into force as here described or it would undergo 
deep modifications.
A point of departure for any analysis, however, is that the EMU suffers of 
some “birth defects” which had been hidden for long but eventually came 
out after the burst of the financial crisis in 2008. One of these defects 
regards the stability of the banking system and how to prevent future 
crises from happening again.
Banks play a fundamental role in the financial field. The liberalization of 
capital  movements  has  permitted  them  to  dramatically  increase  their 
business. At the same time, it has exposed the system to huge risks with 
spillovers throughout the EU. As it is not conceivable a monetary union 
where capital controls have not been abolished completely, such an union 
cannot be stable without a sound banking system.
The  relationships  between  these  different  areas  may  be  defined  as 
“symbiotic”,233 where one directly influence each other and the system, 
namely the financial market, is sustainable only if all the pieces are stable 
and do not create disturbances.
To introduce a banking union would push in an irreversible way towards 
a further integration, with no possibility to distinguish between services, 
capital or banking and provide different degrees of liberalization: all must 
move  at  the  same  pace.  That  does  not  entail  that  different  types  of 
Europe]'  (2012),  Limes  –  Rivista  Italiana  di  Geopolitica,  http://temi.repubblica.it/limes/lunione-bancaria-avvicina-leuropa-al-redde-
rationem/41093 2: the author views the banking union as a complex project made up of four pillars (common rules, single supervisor,  
depositor protection and crisis management tools) and argues that the absence of the last two may seriously undermine the proposal; on  
the same line see Various Authors (n 197) 19
233 Hindelang (n 4) 21: the authors refers to capital and monetary union, but the adjective is suitable also with regards to the  
financial services market globally considered.
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integration cannot exist (the EMU comprises only 17 states, the banking 
union  would  likely  regard  only  them),  but  only  that  it  is  no  longer 
acceptable to privilege one aspect to the detriment of others, otherwise 
the integration itself would halt.
The answer to the question is therefore not easy. This work tries to shed 
some light on the most important problems and points to consider in this 
difficult path.
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Conclusion
The internal market is a complex reality. It is not just the sum of different 
elements, as it could have appeared in the beginning of the integration 
process. The decision to liberalize a sector, regardless of which one, has 
always an impact, not just in the economic sphere but also as regards the 
policies. The more the market is integrated, the harder is to step back, 
despite any possible negative effects or spillovers.
The  free  movement  of  capital  has  had  a  tormented  history  and  its 
application  has  required  a  long  time  before  being  recognized  for  the 
value it bears. But like a river it has washed away certainties and obliged 
to confront new challenges. Despite the scant case-law, or the number of 
publications focusing on it, this freedom is important nowadays as never 
before. One of the main pillars of the financial services market, an area 
whose development is fundamental for the economic growth, especially 
in a difficult moment such as that Europe was experiencing when this 
paper was written (mid-2013).
The  connections  between  capital,  its  relative  markets,  the  monetary 
dimension and the single currency, as well as the stability of the banking 
sector  are self-evident  at  a  more careful glance.  The mutual  influence 
they have on each other is a matter of fact that requires a far-reaching 
approach where different knowledges are to be combined. 
No easy solutions exist. The process is bound to continue by means of 
trial and errors, and the benefits deriving are likely to be in the long run 
way more than any possible side effect.
European integration has come a long way, but much has yet to come.
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